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20 MARCH 1987

# West Europe Report

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

DENMARK/GREENLAND

Greenland Affairs Ministry Left With Few Duties (Trine Munk-Petersen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 1 Feb 87) .....	1
Inuit Ataqatigiit Chairman Angered Over Thule Base Policy (Arqaluk Lynge Interview; INFORMATION, 31 Jan-1 Feb 87) .	5

FINLAND

Conservatives, SKDL Issue Election Platforms (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, various dates) .....	13
Sorsa Denies Challenger Role	13
Paper on Elections, Editorial	14
Conservatives' Platform Stresses Prosperity	15
SKDL Program Underlines Ideology	16
Center Party Leadership Divides Over Koivisto, Holkeri (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, various dates) .....	19
Party Secretary Supports Koivisto	19
Newspaper Comment on Statement, Editorial	21
Vayrynen: Conservatives in Coalition	22
Parties Present Programs, Discuss Coalition Possibilities (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, various dates) .....	25
Communist Party Program Viewed, Editorial	25
Sorsa Rejects Conservatives, Editorial	26
SKDL, DEVA Seek Cooperation	27

PORUGAL

'Irangate' Affair: Introspection, Sad National Conclusions (Various sources, 24 Jan 87) .....	29
Officials' Indifference Scored Pointed Questions Asked, by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa	31
Poll Results on EEC Show Widespread Indifference (EXPRESSO, 27 Dec 86) .....	34
Poll Results on Politicians, Parties' Popularity (EXPRESSO, 27 Dec 86) .....	38
Opinion Poll Shows Slight Rise for PS (O JORNAL, 19-23 Dec 86) .....	42
Parliamentary Elections Predicted for October 1987 (TEMPO, 15 Jan 87) .....	45
Moderate Left Seen as Minority in Leftist Spectrum (Jose Pacheco Pereira; SEMANARIO, 24 Jan 87) .....	47
Public's Favorable Perception of Prime Minister (EXPRESSO, 24 Jan 87) .....	49
Azores' Mota Amaral's Fortunes Seen Waning (Nuno Ribeiro; DIARIO DE LISBOA, 13 Jan 87) .....	51
PCP's Statements, PS-PCP Alliance, Dialogue Reviewed (Eduardo Prado Coelho; EXPRESSO, 24 Jan 87) .....	53

SPAIN

Poll Results on Political Parties' Popularity (YA PANORAMA, 25 Jan 87) .....	56
Poll Shows Majority Support Student Protest (EL PAIS, 25 Jan 87) .....	63

SOCIAL

TURKEY

Muslim Fundamentalist Students Disrupt Stage Play (Various sources, 15 Dec 86) .....	66
Students Questioned by Police, Released Commentary Calls for Respect of Rights, by Ergun Goze	67

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

U.S. Helicopter Firm Seeks Turkish Partner (DUNYA, 10 Nov 86) .....	69
Editorial on Functions on Central Bank (DUNYA, 10 Nov 86) .....	70
Developments in Agriculture (Tevfik Gungor; DUNYA, 10 Nov 86) .....	72
Manufacturing Industry Showed Strong Year in 1986 (CUMHURIYET, 15 Dec 86) .....	75

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Organization, Functioning of Naval Arsenal Outlined (Manfred Gottwald; MARINE-RUNDSCHAU, Sep/Oct 86) .....	77
Vertical Antitank Weapon System for Alpha-Jet in Test Phase (Hanfried Schliephake; FLUG REVUE, Dec 86) .....	84
Plans for Multinational 155MM SP Howitzer Abandoned (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 15 Jan 87) .....	86

NETHERLANDS

Navy's Mine Warfare Flotilla Commander Hints at Inadequacies (Robert Hendrick van Spall; MARINE-RUNDSCHAU, Sep-Oct 86)	87
---	----

SWEDEN

Elite Formation To Guard Against Sabotage of Air Bases (Claes Britton; DAGENS NYHETER, 18 Jan 87) .....	90
Young Army Officers Explain Reasons for Early Leaving (Anders Ohman; DAGENS NYHETER, 22 Jan 87) .....	101
Air Force Chief Demands Budget Include New Draken Squadron (Sven Svensson; DAGENS NYHETER, 23 Jan 87) .....	104
Civil Defense System Seen Harmed in Long-Range Defense Plan (Ingemar Myhrberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 24 Jan 87) .....	106
Air Force Hopes New Civilian Pilot Training Eases Officer Drain (Lars Dahl; DAGENS NYHETER, 30 Jan 87) .....	109

ENERGY

GREECE

Energy Production Reportedly Lags  
(I KATHIMERINI, 10 Feb 87) ..... 111

/7310

## GREENLAND AFFAIRS MINISTRY LEFT WITH FEW DUTIES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Feb 87 Sec V p 2

[Article by Trine Munk-Petersen; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The Greenland Affairs Ministry is singing its swan song. At this time next year most of the ministry's areas of responsibility will have been turned over to the Greenland home rule government--but even so it is a shock to many ministry employees that their jobs will soon be nonexistent.

When Denmark's first Greenland affairs minister, Johannes Kjaerbol, opened the new ministry in 1955 he said: "This is only temporary."

It was a temporary solution for more than 30 years. But now it is coming to an end. "It is hard for me to imagine that there will be a Greenland Affairs Ministry after the end of this year," said current Minister Tom Hoyem. He is the 10th in line and will probably be the one who will "lock the door and turn out the lights."

For the last 30 years the Greenland Affairs Ministry has employed around 250 people. Everyone says it has been a good place to work. This was partly because of the extremely varied and interesting work that led to long or short stays in Greenland for many of the workers there. But it was also because the Greenland Affairs Ministry is a young ministry--without the rigid routines, traditions and complex hierarchy of the old ministries. People can talk to each other in the Greenland Affairs Ministry--and if one has to cite a real "tradition" it is the colleagues' evenings of the last 5 or 6 years where people met for lectures on Greenland followed by refreshments and dancing.

The Greenland Home Rule Act was passed in 1979. But in the early years the transfer of responsibility from Danish to Greenland control went slowly. A year after he took over as head of the ministry, Tom Hoyem said he was confident that the ministry would still be in existence in the year 2000. And that helped to strengthen the conviction that had lulled many ministry workers, especially the older ones, that the ministry would "probably last for my lifetime!"

"Through the years there have been rumors from time to time that now the ministry was going to shut down and each time there was some staff turnover," said Inge Riise, union representative for the members of the Retail Business and Clerical Workers Union [HK]. "But the last 10 years have been a calm period. At least until a year ago when things started speeding up. Now no one has any doubt that this is the end."

#### Old Guard

Inge Riise has worked for the Greenland Affairs Ministry for 37 years--and had hoped to celebrate her 40th anniversary there. She is 63 years old and unless she can move with her job area, which will probably be shifted to the Finance Ministry, she must face the fact that early retirement is the most likely prospect for her.

It has been a general tendency in all three groups of workers at the ministry, clerical workers, academic staff and salaried employees, that it has been the younger ones who saw the "handwriting on the wall" and left the ministry while they had time. The somewhat older workers stayed on--and many have now reached the age where job offers are not exactly hanging on trees.

Legal expert Sven Adsersen, who represents the academic staff, said: "Many preferred an exciting job here at the ministry to a loftier career somewhere else. Some are disappointed now because developments suddenly started to accelerate in 1984 at a faster pace than they had anticipated--whether rightly or wrongly. There are probably some who now regret that they did not decide somewhat earlier to leave the Greenland Affairs Ministry. When one is over 45 it is difficult to start doing something new."

It has been something of a balancing act to get the ministry to function in this last period when there is still a lot of work to do but when at the same time both the leadership and union representatives have been encouraging anyone with a job prospect to seize the chance.

The work load has not diminished--as one might think--as areas of responsibility have been transferred to the Greenland government. Every single area that is transferred involves a thorough analysis and extensive legislative work. This requires a ministry operating at full capacity. Even so there are only 170 workers today compared to 250 originally. Many have left and as far as possible new people have not been hired. People move around and try to make do with the resources that are available.

"Shutting down a ministry requires just as much skill, experience and expertise as building one up," said Greenland Affairs Minister Tom Hoyem. "Psychologically it is a strange situation to work harder than ever while at the same time your friends say: 'You're not doing anything, are you? You're shutting down.'"

Undersecretary Christian Jensen runs the Greenland Affairs Ministry on a daily basis during this phasing out process. Christian Jensen came to the

ministry in 1956, when it was only a year old, and among other things he has been ministry secretary under three different Greenland affairs ministers before he was named permanent undersecretary in 1982.

"A special structural committee has been set up to deal with the personnel problems caused by the transition," he said. "Our goal all along has been to avoid firing people. And I think this is possible, in part because the other ministries have agreed--at the request of the Finance Ministry--to take over some of our employees.

"We are also urging our workers to move over to the home rule government, but of course we do not want to coerce anyone. In the cases where salaried employees remain here in Copenhagen I think a good many are interested. At the moment the Greenland government has around 1,000 people employed here in Copenhagen--but in time, as the housing situation in Greenland improves, the goal is presumably to move all the salaried employees up there."

In spite of Christian Jensen's confidence, many of the ministry workers are somewhat nervous when they think about the future. It is not always enough just to be guaranteed employment when one comes from an interesting job in a good working environment.

Ib Toppfer, union representative for the salaried employee group, said: "As a civil servant one can just wait to be transferred somewhere else, but of course most people want meaningful work. When other ministries are forced to accept us, they move their own workers around first, so those from outside get the least exciting jobs."

The Greenland affairs minister shared that view: "We have an agreement with the finance minister, so no one will be out of work. But many will lose an interesting job."

Inge Riise, HK: "It will also be difficult for those who are in line for promotion. They run the risk of a setback when they are moved to another ministry."

Sven Adsersen is personally positive about the plan to shut down the ministry. And he added optimistically: "It is true that many of those who are left at the ministry have reached the critical age, but on the other hand through the years we have acquired experience in very comprehensive areas, we are used to making quick changes and we are flexible and versatile. One is not completely burned out because one has 20-25 years of experience in a variety of areas."

#### Countdown at Greenland Affairs Ministry

1 May 1979: Greenland home rule is introduced.

1 January 1980: The following areas of responsibility are turned over to the local government of Greenland: taxes and duties, the state church, social

services, radio and television, libraries and recreational activities, employment offices and job counseling, etc.

1 January 1981: Vocational training, conservation, country and city planning, high schools and museums are transferred to the local government.

1 January 1984: Hereafter Greenland place names are administered by the local government.

1 January 1985: The production and sales activities of the Royal Greenland Trading Company [KGH], job subsidy arrangements and business legislation, etc., are transferred to the local government.

1 January 1986: The remaining KGH activities and responsibility for the supply of goods, navigation, the postal system and airports are turned over to the local government.

1 January 1987: Housing, Greenland's Technical Organization (GTO) and responsibility for the supply of heat and electricity, fire protection, harbors and roads, sewage, drainage, renovation, telegraph equipment and telephones, regional antennas and town halls are transferred to the local government.

1 January 1988: The home rule government wants the health system transferred to its sphere of responsibility. After that there will only be small tasks left that can be divided up among the other ministries or left to the local government of Greenland--after which the Greenland Affairs Ministry can finally be shut down.

6578

CSO: 3613/44

**INUIT ATAQATIGIIT CHAIRMAN ANGERED OVER THULE BASE POLICY**

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 31 Jan-1 Feb 87 p 12

[Interview with Arqaluk Lynge, chairman of the Inuit Ataqatigiit Party, by Jorgen Dragsdahl; date and place not given; first paragraph is INFORMATION introduction]

[Text] The disclosure of the new Thule radar installation's controversial relationship to the ABM Treaty has demonstrated that colonialism is still alive in Greenland, in the view of Arqaluk Lynge, chairman of one of Greenland's two ruling parties.

When the Greenland parliament meets in March one of the parties in the government of Greenland will demand the establishment of a control body that includes representatives of the parliaments of Denmark and Greenland to oversee the bases until the Arctic is demilitarized.

That was party chairman Arqaluk Lynge's first reaction to the disclosure that things might occur at the American base in Thule that are in conflict with the 1972 ABM Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.

He also said that the head of the Greenland government, Jonathan Motzfeldt, has not taken the matter seriously enough. In addition he sharply criticized the attitude of Danish authorities.

Arqaluk Lynge is "housing minister" in the coalition government formed by Inuit Ataqatigiit [pan-Eskimo party] and the Siumut Party [socialist, radical home-rule party], which Jonathan Motzfeldt represents. The parties have a majority of 14 out of the 26 seats in the Greenland Landsting. The leftist Inuit Ataqatigiit has three representatives.

Arqaluk Lynge was educated in Denmark and was for a number of years a social worker and then a journalist. After the publication of the book "Greenland--Pearl of the Mediterranean" in 1983, which discussed the military installations, Inuit Ataqatigiit [IA] started a debate in Landsting that led to the request that orientation be provided on a regular basis in the future concerning defense issues important to Greenland. Lynge himself said during the

debate that a popular referendum was needed to decide on the future of the bases. That debate is now relevant again.

#### Unpleasant

[Question] Isn't it unpleasant for you that Thule has become part of the superpower showdown?

[Answer] It has always been unpleasant. My feeling is that we as a people have been colonized. And now we are trying to turn history around by governing ourselves.

But at the same time we have learned that there are some things we simply can't do anything about. These are harsh realities and the American bases fall into this category. We have also abandoned the idea we learned as children that Denmark is a big country. As Greenlanders we have discovered the other Inuits in Alaska and Canada. We have received so much information from that quarter and had so many contacts that today we know more than we would have if we had received our information solely through Danish channels.

We have also learned slowly that we must go out in the world when we want to safeguard our existence. We will not be treated the way the Indians were.

#### Lack Information

As ministers in the home rule government we do not have the access to information about defense and foreign policy that other people at the same level have. The government of Greenland has locked itself into this situation. Under the present commonwealth system neither the Faeroes nor Greenland can intervene in or help determine defense and foreign policy.

There is a paradox here. The things INFORMATION and other papers have written about have led me to think it was correct for our party, Inuit Ataqatigiit, to call for a supervisory body under the control of the Greenland parliament since 1983. As things have developed now with the interest of the Danish left wing and the possibility of a treaty violation, I think the outcome must be for the parliaments of Denmark and Greenland to establish a joint supervisory body to oversee the bases.

#### Colonialism

Of course it would be best if Greenland did not have these installations at all, so that no foreign troops were located here. If I may say so, Denmark has insisted that this not occur in its own area.

It is now very clear in this situation that colonialism is continuing in the area of foreign and defense policy, even though Greenland home rule is a step toward greater independence.

[Question] Did it surprise you that there could be treaty problems with the new radar facility?

[Answer] I have always been unhappy about this situation. Through the Inuit Circumpolar Conference [ICC] organization that was started in 1977 we have had contacts with our friends in Canada and Alaska and the rest of the United States and as a result we have acquired a lot of information. I was not aware that there could be treaty problems before Gorbachev and Reagan met in Geneva in the fall of 1985 and the subject of Thule came up. Then I became concerned. But at first I thought that this was a question of the Soviet Union trying to put pressure on a small country, Denmark, so that it would come in conflict with U.S. interests.

#### On the Spot

But now that there is talk about a possible treaty problem, we in Greenland are really on the spot.

We are caught in the middle between the two superpowers. Our big country with its tiny population is in a bind and I have the feeling that we are powerless in this situation. In view of the offhand way in which the foreign minister and others have briefed the Foreign Policy Board I am really afraid that we are just a small pawn in the big political game we have been forced into by our geographical location.

#### [Question] Do you want to get rid of the bases?

[Answer] My party does not say: get rid of the Greenland bases! We say: demilitarize the Arctic. Because if we get rid of them, if that minute theoretical possibility should arise, they will just be moved to Canada. Then it will be the problem of the Canadian Inuits. The Arctic policy that we are developing through ICC says quite plainly that the entire Arctic region should be demilitarized. Not just in the air but also on the ground and at sea. The Arctic and the entire North Atlantic have become a security problem that the Danes and other Nordic peoples have neglected and have simply allowed to continue.

#### Laughable Attitude

#### [Question] How do you feel about the attitude of the Foreign Ministry and its effects?

[Answer] I think that as long as we know we can acquire information in other ways through various organizations the Danish attitude is laughable with all that secrecy. They make a mystery of the whole thing and have created a political situation that could well have been avoided.

It is hard to predict what consequences this will have for Greenland. But I think there should be a unified position on the issue on the part of Greenland. And at the very least we will propose during the Landsting session in March that the question of establishing a joint control body be taken up again. The best thing would be to involve the parliaments of both Denmark and Greenland.

[Question] Why do you want to include the Danes?

[Answer] Because the information available to Danish Folketing members is of a better quality than the information available to Greenland Landsting members. The Danish politicians have a majority with 177 seats (there are two representatives from Greenland, Ed.) but we do have an entry there so that we can express our opinions. There is a Greenlander on the Foreign Policy Board. He is not very concerned. All in all he is not very concerned about any Folketing work. It is undoubtedly very complicated for Mr Otto Steenholt to be a member of this board.

#### Primary Bombing Target

[Question] American experts have said that Thule would be bombed in the first few minutes of a war, so even if a war is halted northern Greenland will have been hit.

[Answer] There is probably a simple trapper in the Thule area who could dispose of that. But it is a reality that things are like that.

I myself have visited the headquarters of NORAD (the North American Defense Command) in the Cheyenne Mountains where all the command systems are, at the invitation of the U.S. government. It was easy for me to see that Thule lay in the middle of the entire defense arena. This means that the system that is being built up today will depend entirely on Thule. Whatever happens in Alaska or Fylingdales, Thule is at the center of things.

There is no doubt that if SDI is developed Denmark will not only be involved but actually forced by the decisions of the American government to give up some areas. So I think it is hypocritical to engage in this footnote policy. It is a cheap shot to pursue a policy that may be progressive down here when at the same time one has Greenland. It is easy for the Danish government to say that it won't have nuclear weapons here in peacetime, but who knows if there are weapons or other offensive possibilities at the Thule base?

Therefore I say that if the debate in Folketing results in anything in the way of an amicable gesture to Greenland, it should be expressed by setting up a control body. At the same time the Danish government should stop pretending that Denmark is Jutland and all that. One must face reality and look at the empire that is made up of Greenland, the Faeroes and Denmark.

The Danes must insist on compliance with the treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union and therefore they should turn to the proper NATO organs and others to find out whether the treaty is being ignored in Thule. It would be an easy out to just set up a control body without pursuing the matter actively once that has been done.

[Question] The control body could be a pawn with its members being dragged off to Thule for an orientation meeting and then sent home again.

[Answer] The most important thing is for the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry to acknowledge their responsibility. They must have a real relationship with the government of Greenland. They should give us all the information they can. But the attitude today is that one plays with missiles the way other people play with slingshots. This matter is too serious for people to say that it is Jorgen Dragsdahl of INFORMATION who is spreading these reports. We know about these things through our organization. And when we call for demilitarization we also expect the Soviet Union to make its contribution.

#### Egoistic Small Nations

There can be some differences between the position of the Danish left wing and what is going on in the Arctic. We saw this with respect to the Social Democrats in Scandinavia when they first talked about a Nordic nuclear-free zone. From our vantage point we looked down and asked: who are these egoistic small countries who are acting big when they know that in reality the only thing that can be done is to have a nuclear-free Arctic too?

If there have to be radar warning systems they should be international. A real effort must be made to inform people if the United States starts something or the Soviet Union does. There must be an obligation to provide information and these radar systems should guarantee that. This will be a necessity when SDI (Reagan's Star Wars project, Ed.) is implemented. And I say "when" because the plans are under way. And it is fruitless to discuss whether or not this will become a reality. Instead of running along behind the Americans we must now learn to see things through their eyes and decide what we can do.

Greenland is in a fortunate position. We are not under the control of either the United States or Canada, where the original inhabitants are treated so badly. And we are fortunate that Denmark is so far away. There is some truth in that viewpoint. But it is being undermined as U.S. interests change. And little Denmark will be forced into some things it may not wish to be involved in.

#### Hypocrisy in Greenland

[Question] You attack hypocrisy in Denmark, but isn't there hypocrisy in Greenland too? You have a lot of benefits because of Thule--icebreaker assistance and so forth.

[Answer] The two other parties think the military installations also benefit the civilian population and therefore no one is calling for their removal. My party is the only one that sees this in context. We must support ICC's policy in this area. There must be a unified evaluation. For this reason the Arctic must be demilitarized.

Hypocrisy and hypocrisy. We in the government have had the attitude that as long as we did not have any direct involvement with decision-making authority,

why fight over it? We agree on a lot of things. But in these foreign policy matters, the contacts go directly to the head of the Greenland government, Jonathan Motzfeldt, and he conveys the information to us in his own way. I do not go directly to the Danish foreign minister. For one thing I am not supposed to and for another I am supposed to go through the Greenland Affairs Ministry. That is the way the system works.

#### Lackeys of Greenpeace

There is also the conduct of the United States. It is lovely to come to the United States so we can see our friends and relations in Alaska, for example. That part of the contact is very important to me. In addition to our Nordic contacts, we have western cultural and business ties.

American government representatives tell us we are very important. They attach great importance to having good mutual relations. Canada is also our closest neighbor. But both countries have a policy that plays into the hands of the Greenpeace organization. There is a trade embargo against us. The seal campaign has ruined the trapping industry. They have stopped at nothing to destroy our economy.

The United States has a trade embargo against the apartheid regime. But what have we done to them? We have given areas of our country to the Americans. We have not shot at them. There is probably not a single American that anyone has anything against. We cannot sell our sealskins. My own sealskin vest was confiscated in Alaska last summer. I have been to the American State Department, I have been to the ambassador here. They have assured me I would get it back, there has just been some kind of hitch. Now 7 months have gone by. I came to Alaska as an official American guest and they took away my clothes!

The Inuits are not exterminating the seals and whales or destroying the environment in the area. But we have paid with mining, base areas, the crash of a B-52 bomber in 1968, when the population helped with the clean-up work. In 1954 the population was forcibly removed from the area. These people have not received any compensation. No one in Denmark is concerned about this. They just say that what happened is over and done with--there can be no question of compensation.

[Question] What about the role Motzfeldt plays? He says the same thing the Danish foreign minister does, that he trusts the Americans.

[Answer] I have not received the information he has and the government has not discussed the matter. So I am waiting for a decision on a joint position. The head of the Greenland government has not consulted me about this.

[Question] Is that something that could be criticized?

[Answer] I find it somewhat difficult to tackle this issue because it does not directly affect the local government. But I certainly think we should have a serious talk about it.

[Question] In other words, you don't like to criticize Motzfeldt directly.

[Answer] If I were the coalition leader with the narrow majority we have in Greenland, I could easily be an opportunist and say that there are two big parties that agree on this. But my party is a member of the coalition and this is a matter we have not had anything to do with directly.

#### Better Utilization

I think Greenland should be able to utilize this situation somewhat better and present some demands. But I do not think it is proper for our coalition parties to ignore this matter. At any rate not at such an early stage. We must acquire more information. If the Danish parliament ascertains that the ABM Treaty has been violated, attitudes will change.

[Question] Has Motzfeldt ignored the gravity of the question?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Is that what you think?

[Answer] Yes. And that is why it is not just a demand but a necessity that this come up at the government level, which has not happened.

#### Danes Get Millions

[Question] Danish firms are shoveling in millions in connection with the construction of the new radar facility and the bases have put billions in Danish pockets over the years. What do you think about that?

[Answer] Greenlanders have also been excluded from a lot of jobs. The government of Greenland has been in contact with Danish Arctic Contractors [DAC], which has many of the base contracts and we now own a seventh of Greenland Contractors, which has the maintenance contracts. But of course that is a small consolation.

[Question] Were you informed that DISA has delivered electronic components for the new radar system and were you informed that DAC has a contract for the construction of the new radar facility?

[Answer] DAC is doing the work there and I hear that the elevators at the new radar facility don't work.

[Question] But were you informed?

[Answer] I knew that DAC had contracts, yes.

#### Secret Millions

[Question] Do you know the size of the contracts?

[Answer] No. Building contracts go through other channels. We are only involved in service contracts.

[Question] And you are not informed?

[Answer] No, we are not told what is going on. We have no military attaches at the bases.

[Question] Isn't it wrong that you don't know who has the contracts and how big they are when construction occurs in Greenland?

[Answer] Yes. It is wrong. And it says something about the problems of the local government in relation to the national authorities on these matters. It is a question of whether the Danish government will provide information about this. We should know what kind of economic activity is going on in Greenland.

[Question] What is left of home rule when you don't even know about economic matters?

[Answer] Well, the bases have always been separate enclaves. We had the strangest and most complicated negotiations with the Greenland Affairs Ministry about taking over the Royal Greenland Trading Company and the Foreign Ministry intervened to prevent the local government from taking over the Royal Greenland Trading Company's activities at the bases. This was done with reference to the defense agreement between Denmark and the United States.

#### Lack of Imagination

Part of the reason why we have not had insight into economic matters is a lack of imagination on the part of the local government. We have not asked about it. We have just begun to receive economic benefits from taking over ocean transport. We have also just begun to get Greenlanders hired. There are around 2,000 Danes at the bases and they can vote in Greenland, even though they live in areas under American jurisdiction. They even have a representative in the Greenland parliament. So workers at the bases are really spoiled. They have great political importance.

6578

CSO: 3613/44

## CONSERVATIVES, SKDL ISSUE ELECTION PLATFORMS

## Sorsa Denies Challenger Role

Helsinki HELSINKIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Jan 87 p 11

[Text] If a challenger should become prime minister, it would have no effect on President Koivisto's chances in the presidential elections. This was what the prime minister, chairman Kalevi Sorsa, thought on Thursday when the Social Democratic Party (SDP) made public its elections slogans and poster.

In Sorsa's opinion, the accession of a presidential candidate to the post of prime minister after the parliamentary elections would primarily hurt Koivisto's other competitors. So far there are two certain candidates for the presidency: the Center Party's Paavo Vayrynen and the Conservative Party's Harri Holkeri. The other [parties] have not yet made their choices. The Social Democrats intend to nominate Koivisto as a candidate next summer.

On Thursday Sorsa and party secretary Eriki Liikanen stressed the fact that prime minister issues and other election campaign details are not important at this point. In their opinion, it is important to determine what the ideological differences between the parties are.

Sorsa was convinced that voters are interested in principles. He thought that details kill people's interest in things and that indifferent politicking drives voters away.

Sorsa deplored the fact that the party's room for maneuvering is so small. If one speaks of principles, the press demands details. If one speaks of details, the press calls them election bait, Sorsa sighed.

## Tax Reform in Government Platform

Like the other parties, the Social Democrats promise to reform the tax structure after the elections. In party secretary Liikanen's opinion, they ought to stick to the general outlines in discussing tax reform. Liikanen warned the leaders of the other parties that getting entangled in details would torpedo the whole tax reform.

In Liikanen's opinion, the general principles of the tax reform must be agreed on in the government platform. He was of the opinion that they would succeed in implementing reforms after the presidential elections. The elections are to be held next year.

The Social Democrats have chosen an old symbol, a dark red rose, as the basis for their parliamentary election poster. Their election slogan is: "We dream of friendship and solidarity in the world."

Sorsa mentioned lack of concern, indifference and violence as the antitheses of this slogan. According to Sorsa, the Social Democrats want to squarely oppose these.

Sorsa said that the party wants to lay emphasis on the guiding ideals that are still concealed behind the fluctuations of everyday politics with its election poster.

#### Paper on Elections

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Jan 87 p 2

[Editorial: "A Government That Will Last Out the Election Term"]

[Text] People assume that the administrative bodies to be formed after the parliamentary elections will be short-lived. The presidential elections will be held only 10 months after the parliamentary elections. It is generally assumed that the new government will submit its request to resign to the president in accordance with old parliamentary custom as soon as the results of the election have been determined.

Recently, statements have been made here and there in which the change of government after the presidential elections is not taken for granted. At least the Social Democrats and the Center Party seem to be attracted to the idea, despite the fact that the leading figures in the government are tired of one another. Kalevi Sorsa recently spoke of this as an alternative worth considering. As for Erkki Liikanen, he indicated the same thing in passing when the SDP presented its election platform on Thursday. Paavo Vayrynen is also known to consider a government that will last out the election term to be a possibility, and the idea is probably not unfamiliar to the president of the republic either.

In this respect Finnish parliamentary tradition is very clear: It has become the custom for governments to submit a request to resign. In spite of this, it behooves us to ask whether compliance with parliamentary tradition is an end in itself that takes precedence over other important goals. There are no rules that oblige the government to resign because of the presidential elections. We might well consider this especially now, just before the elections when the parties are refining their election strategies.

It is easy to see what would happen if a government lasting for about 2 months were to be formed after the elections. The parties would take advantage of the situation to give their ministerial posts, along with the salaries that go with

them, to second and third-rate politicians. A pork barrel government would produce a political maverick.

The future problems to be resolved by the government will, however, be on an entirely different level in terms of their dimensions. Do not the country's economic situation, the budget, the value of the markka, employment and especially wage policy quite the contrary require an exceptionally strong government operating for a long term that relies on the support of a clearcut parliamentary majority? Something will come of tax and constitutional reforms only if a government cognizant of its status champions them.

In Finland we are just now otherwise getting rid of the plague of short-term governments. It would be regrettable for us to take a step backward in the process just when we had taken two steps forward. Finland's political existence has suffered from changes of government during the entire postindependence period. A clearcut turning point occurred in respect to this in 1977. The consensus period has clearly stabilized our administrations.

In our negotiations over the government we could right from the start set ourselves the goal of a government that will last for the entire election term. The presidential elections could then offer us an opportunity to reassess the situation. If they should decisively change the political configuration, we could then look to parliamentary tradition for help. The government would submit its request to resign.

But we could also consider the matter the other way round: The president would not necessarily have to accept the resignation request if the government is capable of functioning and wants to stay on. There are clear precedents for this, the most recent one in 1978.

#### Conservatives' Platform Stresses Prosperity

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Feb 87 p 6

[Article: "Conservative Party Election Issues Inspire Credibility: 'A Home for Ever one and a Basic Security of at Least 1,800 Markkas'"]

[Text] A 4-year-old Finnish girl picking cornflowers dominates the Conservative Party's parliamentary election poster. Black and, in some people's opinion, duck-shaped [cf. Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa (sorsa 'duck')] clouds are retreating beyond the horizon on the poster.

The biggest nonsocialist party is fishing for votes with the slogan as bait: Seize your opportunities for tomorrow; we will create the security for your future.

"In addition to tax reform, the key issues we will be addressing in the coming elections are: Every Finn should have a home, every Finn should be guaranteed a basic subsistence and every family should have alternative child care options," chairman Ilkka Suominen specified.

In the opinion of the Conservative Party, 1,800 markkas a month is a sufficient guarantee of basic subsistence. The funds needed to set up the system would be obtained by turning to taxes again and laying emphasis on indirect taxation.

#### Reprimands for Ahde

Environmental issues are also crucially raised in the Conservative Party election platform. Suominen delivers a pack of reprimands to Social Democratic Environment Minister Matti Ahde.

"None of the essential environmental issues has been dealt with. He has mainly tackled the elimination of private ownership. There has, for example, been no improvement in the air pollution situation," Suominen criticized him.

To eliminate the housing shortage, the Conservative Party would proceed by having the government grant loans for the construction of rental housing and by granting a full 5-year rental income [tax] deduction for new housing or housing that has not been rented before.

The Conservative Party would tackle the day-care shortage and the declining birth rate by paying parents who stay at home 2,000 markkas a month for child care and by making the cost of private day care eligible for a tax deduction of up to 2,000 markkas a month.

Patients with long-term illnesses, whose care they demand be improved, have not been forgotten either in the election platform. They propose that the percentage [of their expenses] allocated for student scholarships to support their studies be increased to at least 50 percent. The Conservative Party demands that the government invest more money in research and provide proper operating conditions for local radio stations.

Suominen believes that they will gain an election victory with this platform. He did not want to bet on how big the Conservative Party's parliamentary delegation would be, but he did think that they would have "many more" seats.

If they do not win more seats and if they have even fewer seats than they do now, Suominen promised that he would look for another job.

Party secretary Jussi Isotalo also promised the same thing. "I certainly risk making my job an area of central responsibility for the result if the Conservative Party does not win in the elections," he said.

The Conservative Party now has 44 parliamentary representatives. The Conservative Party has not entered into any election unions. The party will be running on its own full ticket in all election districts.

#### SKDL Program Underlines Ideology

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Feb 87 p 7

[Article: "SKDL Would Toss Moneyed Interests Out of Finland"]

[Text] The People's Democrats are starting out for the parliamentary elections by emphasizing new values with their ideological program. The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] is seriously aiming for about 20 seats in Parliament with its slogan opposing the power of money.

On the SKDL election poster published on Wednesday, a top-hatted Croesus is tossed down from his present position of power. "Down with the moneyed interests," the brightly colored poster proclaims to voters.

The chairman of the SKDL, Member of Parliament Esko Helle, deplores the fact that there is generally no longer any ideological content in election ads nowadays. "With this poster we would now like to clearly express our view of this society; it is a clear indication of it," Helle explained.

In Helle's opinion, the power of money in present-day society is exaggerated. "The present government has, moreover, with a very willing ear listened to what the banks have wanted to whisper into it. The result has been growing insecurity; the pie of wealth has been divvied up in an increasingly inequitable way."

According to the election platform approved by the SKDL party administration on Wednesday, the People's Democrats would like to set in motion in Finland a discussion of values, their order of importance and the policy for implementing them.

Not a single concrete practical demand is made in the SKDL election platform.

In the election platform they are amazed at the fact that we in Finland are moving in a direction which no one wants to move in. "Everyone today wants to reduce unemployment, but it is on the increase. Environmental problems are growing in magnitude, the national income pie is being swiftly divvied up to the advantage of speculators and capitalists and Finnish culture is getting to be narrower and narrower," the undesirable development trends are enumerated in the platform.

In the opinion of the SKDL, the values that govern the development of our society are today formed as it were furtively. "They are not consciously chosen or proclaimed, not to mention the fact that they are not even seriously discussed."

In the party's opinion, the fact that just how nonsocialist our generally accepted values are might be revealed is in the way of any serious discussion. "Inherent in them is a characteristic indifference to people, nature and the world."

The SKDL would propose as new values common responsibility for other people, nature, the world and the future, active efforts on behalf of peace, more broadly based democracy and the nurturing of our national culture.

The SKDL would construct its political objectives of the next few years for the establishment of these values, above all its economic policy line. In the

party's opinion, our economy must shift from one based on the power of money to one based on citizens' power.

The SKDL would also be prepared to join a government with parties that endorse these objectives. Chairman Helle, however, doubted that possibility because it would presuppose adjustments in the current government's policies.

The SKDL's approach to tax reform is fairly close to the Social Democrats' platform with its demands for the treatment of all income on an equal basis. The vagueness of the SDP tax program, however, makes the People's Democrats apprehensive.

Party first secretary Reijo Kakela condemned the debate over marginal tax reform. In his opinion, such a tax does not exist in Finland. "All income is combined at the end of the year and the income tax is determined on the basis of that," he said.

In Kakela's opinion, the demand for a revision of the marginal tax is only a demand to change tax brackets to benefit the wealthy.

The SKDL is aiming for about 20 seats in Parliament in the elections. In Kakela's estimation, it could be more than that if they are lucky, or less if they are unlucky.

At present the SKDL moderates have 17 seats in Parliament. The Stalinist Communists have 10 seats.

SKDL leaders feel that the competition engaged in with the Stalinist Communist election party, the DEVA [Democratic Alternative], for the support of the rank and file has been conducted more quietly than they dared to even hope for only a year ago. "We have not directed our election campaign against the DEVA. It is not our chief opponent," Helle said.

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CSO: 3617/54

**CENTER PARTY LEADERSHIP DIVIDES OVER KOIVISTO, HOLKERI**

Party Secretary Supports Koivisto

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Feb 87 p 9

[Text] The Center Party (KEPU) should support President Mauno Koivisto if Koivisto and Conservative Party candidate bank director Harri Holkeri oppose one another in the final contest. This is the opinion of KEPU parliamentary delegation chairman Kauko Juhantalo.

To be sure, he reminded us that the KEPU will support its own candidate, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, insofar as is possible.

In an interview he granted TURUN SANOMAT and SAVON SANOMAT on Saturday, Juhantalo said that a nonsocialist president is not an end in itself. If the alternatives for the electors are Koivisto and Holkeri, Juhantalo said that his favorite would then be Koivisto.

"Then his experience with the office and the use he has been of to Finland and the esteem he is held in would increase the large amount of support for him. I cannot imagine that there would be a change [of presidents]," Juhantalo said.

Juhantalo also offered an opinion on the poor terms the main government parties, the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the KEPU are on with one another. He feels that their quarrels might ease up if the KEPU were to offer someone other than Vayrynen to head the government to be formed after the elections. He did not mention any names, but stated that "it cannot be denied that promoting Vayrynen might increase the tension in the atmosphere."

Juhantalo does not feel that there are any obstacles to Vayrynen's possibly also being the next government's foreign minister "since there will be no question of any dispute over our foreign policy line in the presidential elections."

He would like to see a coalition between the KEPU and the SDP as the basis for the future government. "That could be extended to the Right if the election results so indicate."

### **"Juhantalo Has His Own Aspirations"**

Northern Finnish women members of the KEPU are angry with Juhantalo because of an interview published in the Social Democratic newspaper on Friday.

During the interview Juhantalo said that Vayrynen is seriously considering resigning from the chairmanship of his party at the party congress in the summer of 1988. According to the Social Democratic newspapers, Juhantalo said that he had discussed the matter with Vayrynen.

In commenting on the news item, both Juhantalo and Vayrynen denied that they had discussed [Vayrynen's] resignation.

On Saturday the vice chairman of the KEPU women's organization, Member of Parliament Tytti Isohookana-Asunmaa, charged Juhantalo with having deliberately sown discord within the party. In Isohookana-Asunmaa's opinion, a discussion of Vayrynen's status should not have been launched just before the elections.

Speaking in Oulu, Isohookana-Asunmaa assured her listeners that the KEPU rank and file support Vayrynen as a presidential candidate and as chairman. She suspected that Juhantalo is now courting the Social Democrats because of his own aspirations for power.

### **"Let Those Who Would Drop Vayrynen Calm Down and Be Sensible"**

As for KEPU vice chairman Hannele Pokka, in Rovaniemi he hoped that those who would drop Vayrynen would calm down and be sensible.

Pokka was surprised at the discussion of Vayrynen's chairmanship that had been touched off and said that Vayrynen would continue to be chairman for as long as the rank and file have confidence in him.

Pokka wanted the presidential candidates to be left in peace so that they could do their jobs. In his opinion, being a candidate for the presidency cannot be an obstacle to functioning as prime minister.

### **Kaariainen Criticizes Social Democrats**

KEPU party secretary Seppo Kaariainen has criticized the Social Democrats for their dictatorial policies and for trying to gain the upper hand in politics. In the opinion of Kaariainen, who was speaking in Varkaus, the SDP has used the mandate it received from the entire trade union movement and the status of the president's party for its own benefit. In Kaariainen's opinion, the way it uses its power has become slanted and is not in keeping with the support provided the SDP by the people.

In Kaariainen's opinion, government policy controlled by the Left can no longer be allowed to continue after the elections. In its stead he wants a government composed of the three big majority [parties] controlled by the KEPU, one "that will successfully handle the nation's affairs with a lasting grip on things and throughout the entire election term."

## Puolanne Urges Tax Reform

Conservative Party parliamentary delegation chairwoman Ulla Puolanne pressed for tax reform. In her opinion, it should be done immediately after the elections and it should not be buried under endless studies and reports.

Puolanne criticized the government parties for having repeatedly postponed necessary tax reforms. According to Puolanne, citizens do not understand the Social Democrats' desire to postpone tax reform until after the presidential elections.

### Newspapers Comment on Statement

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Feb 87 p 5

#### [Editorial roundup]

[Text] KEPU parliamentary delegation chairman Kauko Juhantalo's interview in the Social Democratic newspapers on Friday and its advance publicity has irritated the chief editors of the Centrist newspapers. As for the Social Democratic newspapers, they say that where there's smoke there's fire. There may be some truth, or at least behind-the-scenes intrigue, in the talk of Paavo Vayrynen's intention to resign from the chairmanship of the KEPU.

#### Vayrynen Is Not Going Anywhere

KESKISUOMALAINEN, which is close to the KEPU, has criticized the Social Democratic newspapers for forgetting the basic rules of journalism because those papers roused a ruckus about the Juhantalo interview even before it was published.

The Social Democratic papers reported on Thursday that Juhantalo would disclose on Friday that Vayrynen was going to resign from the party chairmanship in the summer of 1988. "Juhantalo has denied the statements obtained in the interview. Party secretary Seppo Kaariainen has labeled what was printed an election tactic," KESKISUOMALAINEN noted.

In the newspaper's opinion, nothing is threatening Vayrynen's position. If Vayrynen leaves to take on another position, he will do so of his own free will, not because the rank and file are demanding it, KESKISUOMALAINEN writes in his defense.

"We know that Paavo Vayrynen has often pondered the duration of his chairmanship these past few years. By next summer he will have served 7 years in that post. If Vayrynen is not elevated to the post of president of the republic in 1988, he may seriously consider whether it makes any sense for him to stay on as chairman for very many years more. An excellent alternative might be for him to make room for fresh recruits in a few years time."

## Unfounded News Report

The claim that Vayrynen is going to resign and that behind it is his dissatisfaction with how power is concentrated in him is unfounded, the KEPU's ILKKA writes.

The newspaper wonders how the interview and the news report were published before they received so much publicity. The paper suggests that the reason may be that, while the SDP's own press does not pack much weight, it has a lot of friends among the "neutral" press media.

ILKKA assures us that the KEPU has never been more united with regard to its leadership than it now is with regard to its goals.

## Former Chairmen Expelled

Although in different quarters they have hastened to deny the truth of Juhantalo's statement in the interview, in this case it may be that where there's smoke there's fire, ETEENPAIN (Social Democratic) writes.

"Vayrynen has elevated himself to almost the status of an autocrat within the party. Such behavior arouses opposition right off. The consequences will not, however, be propitious for Vayrynen's long-term personal career plans."

"If Vayrynen resigns from his post on his own initiative, he will be changing the practice that has prevailed in the KEPU. Its chairmen have usually been replaced by expulsion."

## Cold Relations

"That Vayrynen may be thinking of resigning is not without cause if the KEPU wants to avoid being labeled just a presidential election organization without any other aspirations," KANSAN LEHTI (Social Democratic) quips.

The paper suggests that there are many reasons behind Juhantalo's interview: Relations between Vayrynen and Juhantalo are admittedly not the warmest and Juhantalo is generally regarded as a suitable candidate for the post of chairman of the KEPU.

## Vayrynen: Conservatives in Coalition

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Feb 87 p 9

[Text] The KEPU's presidential candidate and chairman, Foreign Affairs Minister Paavo Vayrynen, is demanding that the Conservative Party be included in the government after the elections.

Vayrynen, who was the guest speaker at the Pohjois-Pohjola Fraternity's 80th anniversary celebration on Saturday, reiterated the idea he has presented before of forming a "new popular front" with the SDP, the KEPU and the Conservative Party.

## Kekkonen at Ostrobotnia Exactly 20 Years Ago

Speaking before his own fraternity, Vayrynen recalled that exactly 20 years before, at the same anniversary celebration at Ostrobotnia, President Urho Kekkonen advocated that the Communists be admitted to the government after nearly 20 years in the opposition.

In that famous speech which gave rise to much discussion, Kekkonen said that the Communists must be integrated into Finnish society as citizens with full rights.

Referring to Prof Erik Allardt's studies, Kekkonen also argued for letting the Communists into the government by narrowing the differences between the classes and settling disagreements:

"Since studies on how people vote show that People's Democratic voters are on the average poorer, mostly unemployed and have had less schooling than, for example, Social Democratic voters, keeping the People's Democrats out of the government means that the weakest segment of the population of this country does not have the same political rights as the others and that its political influence is diminished. The political disagreement between the People's Democrats and the other [parties] is just the thing needed to maintain and heighten the division of the classes and to prevent the settlement of disputes relating to the division of the classes."

Especially conservatives criticized Kekkonen's speech. Later conservative speeches became more moderate. Kekkonen's speech was considered to be what set in motion the consensus policy. The Communists, who were at first grateful to Kekkonen, later suspected that Kekkonen had with his speech split the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] into two wings: a moderate one desirous of participating in the government and a more radical, opposition-minded one.

### Conservative Party Before the Communists

In his own speech, unlike Kekkonen, Vayrynen placed the Conservative Party before the Communists. In Vayrynen's opinion, the Communists may, of course, participate in the government if they want to.

Vayrynen said that it has been hard for him to change his own ideas. Right from his student politics days, he was groomed for the "old popular front" and he did not know anything else.

Vayrynen justified admitting the Conservative Party into the government on the basis of three reasons. Finland is becoming an information society in which a spirit of enterprise is of decisive importance in creating jobs and developing production. The importance of businessmen's organizations has also considerably grown.

Support for the Left is plummeting and support for the Right and the Center is increasing. "In an information society the center of gravity must move to the Left in the direction of a reformed Center and in general the nonsocialists," Vayrynen insisted.

**Government He Hopes for: "Expanded Center-Left Coalition"**

Vayrynen also applied the term "expanded Center-Left coalition" to the government he hopes for. Vayrynen believes that a government composed of the SDP, the KEPU and the Conservative Party would function better than a Center-left government composed of the KEPU and the SDP.

As for social policy, Vayrynen believes that the Conservative Party and the KEPU are in agreement on the development of basic security. Both parties have proposed that social security be combined with basic security.

As for agricultural policy, the SDP and the Conservative Party have been incapable of proposing a credible alternative to the present agricultural policy administered by the KEPU. Vayrynen was more concerned over the regional policy of the government he hopes for.

"Our cautious optimism with regard to the regional policy of the new coalition is largely based on the fact that the Conservative Party and the SDP would not have to fear unfair competition by each other for the favor of the voters of the large population centers of the South since both would be in the government," Vayrynen predicted.

Vayrynen also reassured reluctant Social Democrats who fear that they would be alone in the government, squeezed by the nonsocialists.

"Their fear is groundless. KEPU and SDP policies are still close to one another on many basic issues. Furthermore, on some issues the Conservative Party is closer to the Social Democrats than it is to the Center.

"In this respect too, it is the mirror image of the popular front: The SDP's position could even be made easier by the Conservative Party's participation--just as the KEPU's position was eased by a coalition with the Communists in a popular front," Vayrynen reassured them.

11,466  
CSO: 3617/55

## PARTIES PRESENT PROGRAMS, DISCUSS COALITION POSSIBILITIES

## Communist Party Program Viewed

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial: "SKP's Revised Platform Draft"]

[Text] Both of the two big parties of the Left, the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the SKP [Finnish Communist Party], plan to confirm their new platforms at their party congresses next summer. In both parties the first platform drafts left their constituents cold. The Social Democrats have decided not to present their rewritten platform until after the elections. Arvo Aalto's SKP has, on the other hand, published its platform paper, which has undergone a considerable change in form, just before the tempestuous election campaign.

In the new platform draft the SKP dissociates itself more purposefully than before from the kind of socialism prevailing in the Soviet Union and the other East European countries. Practical socialism is criticized for its centrally controlled bureaucracy which slows down social progress, for its inefficiency, for thwarting people's natural enthusiasm and sense of responsibility and for being ossified. Nationalization of the means of production would, in the opinion of the SKP, solve only one basic problem. Otherwise, problems are often solved by trial and error methods.

This criticism of practical socialism is a new thing. In the first draft, composed a year ago, the Soviet Union, its Communist Party and proletarian internationalism were very quickly passed over. In the new version proletarian internationalism has been completely omitted. And cooperation between the SKP and the CPSU is primarily associated with friendly relations between the two nations. It is asserted that the West European communist parties operating under the same conditions are the SKP's natural partners in cooperation. The platform's point of view is worldwide, but not a word is said about the world communist movement.

The SKP lays emphasis on its Finnishness in all respects. Up to now it has, like the CPSU, avoided referring to Finland's foreign policy as a neutrality policy. In the revised draft they set themselves squarely behind "a peace-seeking neutrality policy" without mincing any words. The Friendship,

Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact is above all regarded as the mainstay of relations between Finland and the Soviet Union.

Now then, what sort of socialism is Arvo Aalto's SKP aiming for in Finland and by what means [is it to be attained]?

For the SKP socialism is a distant vision of an autonomous socialism, more plainly put: utopia. They are promising to strive to attain it one step at a time in the gentlest of ways, reforming our society at a pace at which the majority of the people are ready to want it and to act to achieve it.

The reader of the SKP platform draft is not urged to engage in a class struggle against other Finns nor is he bored with Marxist theory. The tone is empathetic: Finnish society's achievements up to now have been sizable ones and "the most important elements of the framework for socialism are now ready on the building site." It will be a good thing for us to go on from this to a society in which everything is even much better.

The SKP would nationalize the banks, the insurance companies and the big industrial firms. In the companies they would make the transition to worker self-government, the work week would be radically shortened, everyone would be guaranteed a basic subsistence, more freedom of enterprise for small businessmen than before, family vegetable gardens would be maintained and cooperatives encouraged. The functions of the present democratic organs would be preserved, as would the multiparty system. No party would have special status based on the law. Opponents of socialism would also be granted the right to engage in political activities, etc.

There may be many opinions on the importance of the party platforms. In terms of its content the SKP platform paper at any rate sets the bar high for the authors of the SDP platform. The SKP has taken such a vigorous step in the direction of the worker movement reformist line that there may be something in it for the SDP to think about.

#### Sorsa Rejects Conservatives

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Feb 87 p 2

[Editorial: "A New Popular Front in the Wind"]

[Text] Somewhat surprisingly, the political discussion has already at this point clarified the configurations of the postelection government situation, although no one can, of course, commit himself to anything final before the elections. Discussion of the postelection government has revolved about three principal alternatives: a government of the three big parties, a government of the nonsocialist parties and the present government coalition, which is felt to be a Center-Left government. A government of the three big parties would be the equivalent of one of the new popular front governments marketed by chairman Paavo Vayrynen.

SDP chairman Kalevi Sorsa says that he considers a government of the three big parties to be even more unlikely now than before. Following Sorsa's statement,

it would seem that a government constructed with the SDP, the KEPU and the Conservative Party is being stricken from the list of most likely government alternatives. A government of the three big parties is considered to be a troublesome one for the SDP from the standpoint of the internal balance of power. What would induce the Social Democrats to join a government in which they would constitute a minority alongside the Conservative Party and the KEPU?

Sorsa has, to be sure, presented ideological reasons as justifications of the reservations he has with regard to this. He fears that they may slide to the Right. On the basis of the latest opinion poll, it seems that such arguments have come to play a more central role than before in SDP speeches. The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] has apparently gotten through the trough of the wave as concerns the development of support for the party and the SDP must take note of this.

Nor can SMP [Finnish Rural Party] chairman Pekka Venhamo's clearly negative position of a government of the three big parties be ignored. If they want to maintain a government of the three big parties as a realistic alternative, it will have to be backed by political credibility.

#### SKDL, DEVA Seek Cooperation

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Feb 87 p 2

[Article: "SKDL and DEVA Try to Extend Parliamentary Proceedings; Last Parliamentary Session Will Be on 10 March"]

[Excerpt] The Communists are trying to get the close of Parliament's proceedings to be postponed until next week. At the start of the session on Friday, Ensio Laine of the Democratic Alternative (DEVA) and Anna-Liisa Jokinen of the SKDL made a motion for the session term to be extended. The motion was defeated by a vote of 153 to 25.

The Speaker Council moved that proceedings came to a close on Saturday when Parliament is to discuss the final bills of the election term. Among others, the employment bill, the marriage bill, the medicine bill and the Kitkanniemi conservation bill will be passed.

Laine and Jokinen stated their reasons for wanting a postponement in an urgent government bill. The Left would have wanted to further discuss the administration of the Wartsila Shipyards after the merger, the severance of diplomatic relations with South Africa and the provision of basic security for the poor.

Independent Liisa Kulhia also supported an extension of the proceedings. Pentti Skon (SMP) did not jump on the opposition bandwagon this time, although, in his opinion, there are still items in the government program that have not been dealt with.

Several representatives submitted bills as late as Friday. Reino Paaslinna (Social Democrat) proposed laws governing restrictions on evictions and a ban on the maintenance of vacant housing units. As for Sakari Valli

(Conservative), he would have further wanted to discuss bathing facilities for the parties.

The day session on Friday went quickly. Among others, bills governing capital were passed after the third deliberation.

The government's transport agency bill was also passed after the third deliberation, but it has still to be approved by the new Parliament.

The representatives emptied their desks of old papers in the afternoon. Layer cakes were brought to the offices in Parliament for the different farewell parties.

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## 'IRANGATE' AFFAIR: INTROSPECTION, SAD NATIONAL CONCLUSIONS

## Officials' Indifference Scored

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Jan 87 p 12R

[Excerpts] The threads of Irangate also became entangled in Lisbon in a suggestive coincidence with the Northern saga of "Sao Bentogate," acclaimed by the COMMERClO DO PORTO as the serial story of the season.

The caricature of "Sao Bentogate" (the reference is to the street where the PJ headquarters in Oporto is located) is a strange mimicry, at our provincial scale, of the global spectacle of Irangate, in which the White House appears transvestized as a police headquarters. As a matter of fact, in its obvious excess that caricature betrays a deep facet of the country: that of sordid and "institutionalized" complicity linking local "prominent personalities," people of the "milieu," and senior staff members of the police. The dizzying peregrination of the central figure in the case--a veritable subject for fiction--reveals the multiple meshes of the network from which emerges a certain Northern society (and which its press dissects with symptomatic voracity).

It is that same facet that similarly prevails in the story of the Portuguese involvement in the smuggling of arms to Iran and the Nicaraguan "contras." The impunity that has permitted the existence of that sordid complicity is the same that keeps in operation the networks of the arms business, which the state persists in ignoring despite its preponderant participation in the companies of that sector.

The inside information about that shady business allows us to understand to what degree that institutionalized impunity coexists shoulder-to-shoulder with the political immaturity of the state. There is no image of sovereignty that will withstand the spectacle of our decadent arms industry--where coups de main and the fiercest competition prevail--because the vacuum and gross mercenariness of Portuguese foreign policy is exposed there in all of its rawness.

In no other European country--not to mention the United States, obviously--could one conceive that an identical scandal of state dereliction would arouse such indifference among the political structures and public opinion,

in a tacit acceptance of the inevitability of our being a peripheral entrepot of international shady business. Meanwhile, the Lisbon daily press brings us not its own independent investigation of the case but a lazy and repetitive collage of agency despatches reporting American reactions and "revelations." The work done by Portuguese journalists, and specifically EXPRESSO's revelation of the arms traffic to the "contras"--quoted by the U.S. press, television and radio, and by the BBC, with source reference--would end up being consumed second-hand via the WASHINGTON POST (which published identical news 6 hours after our edition came out). This rejection of journalistic investigation, the rigid bureaucratism and tag-along nature of the daily press, the slackness that is lulled by the reproduction of agency "telexes" is the exact counterpoint (and the favorite sustenance) of the apathy of public opinion. The Lisbon newspapers bring us news from EL PAIS about the activity of the GAL in Portugal (when EL PAIS explicitly cites EXPRESSO as the original source of that information) or, with schizophrenic masochism, reproduce the current image of our country in the American press: that of a "banana republic."

In fact, if the American journalists were to read the Lisbon daily press, they would find, almost without exception, a panorama characteristic of colonized news, devoid of vitality, irremediably provincial, accenting that image of a country of venal officials and "easy" politicians that we usually associate with situations of dependence in the Third World. In this case, moreover--and to our greater humiliation--Guatemala itself launched an investigation into the false export of Portuguese arms to that country--in fact diverted to the Nicaraguan "contras."

The embarrassed silence or the hasty declarations of political innocence with which each is trying to shake the water off his own cloak reveal the almost "taboo" nature that the question of smuggled arms has assumed. Some feigned forgetfulness or surprise; others allege (only now) that they had not been informed, but all preferred to maintain the alibi of the secret: basically, "nobody knew," nobody is responsible. And what would constitute a childish and politically untenable strategem in countries with civic and political maturity seems to be accepted calmly in Portugal.

No one may be fully at ease to cast the first stone and demand democratic openness in the operation of the institutions. The fear is spreading that the dirty secrets can be "destabilizing" and directly or indirectly affect the images of credibility and political authority. For that reason, the watchword consists in playing down, that is, politically deflating the suspected "dossiers" or the scandals that bare the impotence of the state. But the political carelessness or insensitivity that are manifested in such crucial areas end up undermining and exposing to ridicule the very pretensions to national sovereignty.

Basically, impunity continues to be the backdrop on which are inscribed the intricate links between the multiple networks of dark interests of which Portugal is the platform today--ranging from the case of the arms to the recruitment of mercenaries for the GAL--in a story of shamefaced gangsterism. The role of bridge that the geostrategists have discovered for this country

is, thus, no more than that of a sort of voiceless and faceless intermediary in the sordid business with which others do not want to dirty their hands. Are we, then, going to be doomed to be a sub-protectorate, a transit airport, or a decadent supplier for unmentionable traffic that the politicians and public opinion "fear" to know about? Will the Portuguese "bridge" be simply an anecdotal copy of the American "gates?" Should Portugal already be translated as Portugate?

#### Pointed Questions Asked

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 24 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Excerpts] It is not often, but sometimes events overtake expectations, compelling short postponements or unexpected intrusions.

That is what happened this week. The case already commonly designated as "Irangate" and its special projection in our country demand that a matter of such gravity not pass without immediate comment.

The matter in question raises legitimate doubt about the degree of awareness existing among the Portuguese governing class regarding the cooperating role of our country with the U.S. administration in the area of arms traffic and the corresponding public or veiled quid pro quo compensation.

At the same time, it is frighteningly intriguing how it is that nobody in Portugal is politically responsible for systematic operations of fraud in the destination of the arms, which appear as being sent to Guatemala and in reality go to a quite different destination.

In the absence of responsible politicians who assert themselves as such, national public opinion shows an almost complete lack of sensitivity toward this case, as toward many others on the political, economic, and social scene, revealing that amorism, indifference, and amorality are the most prominent features of our civic climate.

#### Political Service to the United States

Let us concentrate on the national implications of "Irangate."

It demonstrates that for years on end Portugal has served as a revolving gate for the arms traffic sponsored by U.S. official agencies.

Since it is not believable that the successive governments did not know anything about it, it is proper to ask what is the extent of that knowledge and the magnitude of the political compensation received by Portugal.

We are still rationalizing as if the destination of the arms were actually the declared one and everything transpired in the most serene legality.

Under that assumption, it would really be an essential geostrategic service for an ally of Portugal.

Consequently, it seems reasonable to inquire what type of compensation was obtained by our authorities.

We are among those who prize Portuguese-American relations of cooperation, including military ones, provided that they are conducted in an open and legal climate. We believe also that it is unimaginable that such a sensitive area as the arms business can be viewed by any government in a manner dissociated from its overall policy, as if it involved the buying and selling of home appliances or articles of clothing.

We, thus, have the conviction that there must have been compensation, beginning in the administration of the Central Bloc Government, judiciously arranged by the Executive. It will not be inappropriate to ascertain its scope, whatever may have been its visible expression.

#### An Intriguing Ignorance

Another quite different aspect of the same case pertains to the discovery made now, that after all the alleged destination of many of the weapons was false, the documentation presented was forged, the actual traffic being different from what it appeared to be.

When officials of the previous government were questioned, their reply was simple and immediate: the matter did not merit the intervention of the ministry, which suggests the easy idea that some anonymous bureaucrat had acted in that way, perhaps negligently, permitting the illegal act that has occurred.

It seems unbelievable but true. The arms trade, especially the real destination of those arms, is a matter of no importance to the Portuguese government.

Happy the government that has so many fundamental decisions to make, so many essential matters to study that a bunch of "peanuts," like planes landing and taking off with arms in national territory, can be handed over to any third-class clerk!

If it were not for the interest of the U.S. news media, the Portuguese today would still not know that and other curious facets of the case.

Had it not been for the intervention of a member of the present government, blocking the operations underway in order to check, our authorities perhaps would have remained under the illusion that the arms were being sent in the opposite direction of their real destination.

If the vogue catches on, one day soon we will have arms labeled for Iran flying to Iraq; arms earmarked for Israel taking off for Libya; and arms destined for Honduras arriving safe and sound in Nicaragua.

### Nothing is Important or Serious

There remains one final observation: nothing is important or serious in Portuguese political, economic, and social life. Unless it is what is not important, as a friend of ours, an impartial and dispassionate observer, said the other day.

A politician lies? It is natural, it is part of the job. A government official contradicts himself? That is a proper course for his position. A serious illegality is charged? That juridical nicety is met with a curt shrug of the shoulders. An economic official does not fulfill his promises? Economics is not yet an exact science. A cloud of corruption arises in a public agency? As a rule, either the one involved leaves prudently on his own, or no one will have the indelicacy to demand punishment. There is a report about the disappearance of funds from a public budget, bound across the borders? An official source assures us immediately that: financial control is complete and strict.

Little by little, there has become ingrained in our social climate the practice of all-understanding: of irresponsibility disguised as tolerance, of impunity transvestized as deference, of lobbyism garbed as the salutary pluralism of interests, of savage neocorporativism justified by the stimulating self-defense of the most diversified strata, groups, and sectors in the community.

"Irangate" is nothing important in Portugal. As "Watergate" would not have been if a thoughtless newspaper had had the temerity to bother the Portuguese with those superfluous details of behind-the-scenes politics.

In the United States, presidents fall because of a "Watergate." What an atavistic democracy that is, that holds politicians accountable and penalizes and punishes them!

Among us, it is prohibited to punish a politician. On the contrary, the more blameworthy he is today, the more enthusiastically and ecstatically is he applauded and elected the day after tomorrow.

Without great memories or great emotions; with the placid quietude of the swamps, the indifferent silence of the cemeteries, the amoral serenity of the Pilates.

8711/7687  
CSO: 3542/50

## POLL RESULTS ON EEC SHOW WIDESPREAD INDIFFERENCE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 27 Dec 86 pp 12-R--13-R

[Text] What is Europe? A mere speck on the map, or more accurately, a group of small specks that together form a continent. This at least is the opinion of most Portuguese 1 year after their country joined the Common Market, according to a poll conducted nationally by EXPRESSO/Euroexpansao in mid-December.

In fact, definitions of Europe having to do with its cultural, political or economic unity were clearly set aside by those surveyed, who conceive of Europe primarily in its physical and geographic parameters. Nearly 40 percent of the people interviewed mentioned this characteristic (see Table 1). As for a cultural Europe, it appeared in only 11 percent of the responses, economic Europe appeared in 23 percent and political Europe was included in 25 percent (each person could include several definitions).

Table 1

What is Europe to you? How would you define it?  
(percentages)

<u>Cultural Europe</u>	<u>Economic Europe</u>	<u>Physical/ geographic Europe</u>	<u>Political Europe</u>	<u>Other response</u>	<u>No opinion, no answer</u>
11	23	38	25	7	15

Bearing in mind that 15 percent of the people contacted said that they could not or did not want to answer the question, we can conclude that over half of the Portuguese people do not have the concept of a "United States of Europe" in its most diverse supranational aspects, which was the dream of the "founding fathers" of the EEC and is still regarded today as the strategic objective to be achieved. In other words, the Portuguese probably do not feel any more European than they did prior to membership in the EEC. For them, a Europe of nations which is united in its overall actions, with its own identity drawn from a mosaic of related cultures, and with a role to play in the world as a block and a power and a force on the front line in the march of civilizations, is something nonexistent. We are Europeans only

because we happen to be contiguous to the others, and by joining the EEC we remain next to them, but not together with them, according to what those interviewed seem to imply.

#### A Lack of Information?

To what can we attribute this tendency to turn our backs on a Europe that has just welcomed us? Of course many people purely and simply do not believe it. But it is also natural that the apathy would stem from our people's ignorance with regard to this new geo-political-economic-cultural area (perhaps not new, but rather our ancient homeland to which we are returning in a way after traveling on other seas and continents).

How many Portuguese information agencies have issued clear, compelling and accessible reports on this matter that has had such an effect on life in this country? From the information we have received, the Portuguese people do not think of the European Community as anything more than a series of meeting rooms in Brussels where interminable, incomprehensible negotiations take place. Why not accept our people's feeling of separation from what Europe actually represents?

In a breakdown of the answers by variables (region, "habitat," age, sex, education and political party), there was a certain homogeneity in the answers to this question. There were actually substantial differences only with regard to a cultural Europe: this concept was mentioned by nearly one-fourth of the respondents in Lisbon, while only 15 percent of the citizens of Oporto mentioned it and 6 percent of people living in the rest of the country. The South, coastal and urban dwellers, moreover, attach much more importance to the cultural component of Europe than those living in the North, interior and rural areas. For example, 17 percent of the city-dwellers referred to this concept, as opposed to less than 5 percent of those living in rural areas.

As for a breakdown on party lines (1985 legislative vote), the major divergence is among PRD supporters. Only 2 percent of them regard Europe as having cultural unity, while over 10 percent of the electorate of any of the other major parties have this concept.

The most controversial question had to do with whether or not those polled felt "pride" at having their country as a member of the Common Market (Table 2). There was a certain trend to be ambivalent (a typically Portuguese position) in the overall responses: 38 percent replied "more or less," neither good nor bad, rather the contrary (isn't this also indicative of the lack of information referred to earlier?). But the answers appeared more decisive when the replies were analyzed by political party: None of the APU electorate responded "very proud," and only 7 percent of the PRD voters gave this response, whereas over 20 percent of all the other parties (PS, PSD and CDS) fit in this category (the "proudest" are the Centrists, at 26 percent). Following the same pattern, over 40 percent of the APU voters claimed to feel "no pride," while the figures for the PS and the CDS were no more than 9 and 7 percent, respectively.

Table 2

How do you feel about Portugal's membership in the EEC?  
(percentages)

<u>Very proud</u>	<u>Somewhat proud</u>	<u>So-so</u>	<u>Very little pride</u>	<u>Not proud</u>	<u>No opinion or answer</u>
14	23	33	8	18	3

The two major cities were also divided on the question of pride: only 9 percent of Lisbon residents felt "very proud" at their country's membership in the EEC, as opposed to 27 percent of Oporto's inhabitants. An unusual observation is that although Oporto residents are less aware of Europe's cultural proclivities than Lisbon's population, and perhaps even the most ignorant on the continent (21 percent did not give any definition for Europe, as opposed to only 5 percent in Lisbon), they do, however, seem to have reacted more strongly to Portugal's membership in the European Community.

Since Portuguese do not tend toward the extremes, the majority believe that the EEC's impact on overall developments in Portugal in 1986 has been neither significant nor minor (Table 3). Of course, following our previous reasoning, the impact was greater for the Centrists (33 percent regarded it as "very important") than for APU sympathizers (11 percent). But the general trend is toward intermediate positions: "of some importance" or "so-so."

Table 3

What is the EEC's impact on the general situation in Portugal?  
(percentages)

<u>Highly significant</u>	<u>Somewhat significant</u>	<u>So-so</u>	<u>Relatively insignificant</u>	<u>Not significant</u>	<u>No opinion or answer</u>
20	32	23	11	12	3

Finally, in response to the question regarding the government's policy vis-a-vis the EEC (Table 4), responses varied widely: no APU voters regarded government policy as "highly effective," and only 3 percent of CDS voters responded in the "totally ineffective" category. The rest followed the same overall trends, with most of the answers falling in the "so-so" category.

Table 4

How effective is the Portuguese Government's policy vis-a-vis the EEC?  
(percentages)

<u>Highly effective</u>	<u>Somewhat effective</u>	<u>So-so</u>	<u>Relatively ineffective</u>	<u>Not effective</u>	<u>No opinion or answer</u>
11	24	38	13	7	8

It could be said that EEC membership is viewed by the Portuguese as neither important nor unimportant. Something needs to be done to clarify this issue that will have a decisive impact on Portuguese society in the coming years.

[Box, p 12-R]

#### Methodology

Universe: The total electorate on the continent.

Sampling: 509 persons regularly participating on the panel.

EXPRESSO/Euroexpansao: Selection on the basis of the "quota" method.

Technique: Personal interviews by telephone, with a structured questionnaire.

Data collection: Between 15 and 18 December 1986, by 23 interviewers.

Reliability of results: The margin of error for this sampling is 4.3 percent for one degree of probability of 95 percent.

Euroexpansao was responsible for collecting and processing the data, while EXPRESSO analyzed them.

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CSO: 3542/35

## POLL RESULTS ON POLITICIANS, PARTIES' POPULARITY


Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 27 Dec 86 p 24

## [Text] Bipolarization Persists

Portuguese voting patterns again appear to be relatively stable, with a clear trend for the vote to be polarized between the PSD and the PS. The PSD remains at 40 percent, an intermediate and stable platform between Cavaco Silva's popularity (close to 50 percent) and the popularity of the Social-Democratic government (around 30 percent). The PRD, moreover, does not appear to be in a position to threaten the PS's strong position, with a 20 point gap separating them. One of the most unusual findings disclosed by the Popularity Panel is the stability of the electorate in contrast with the profound changes in image that the political leaders are undergoing, especially Vitor Constancio and Ramalho Eanes.

The relative consolidation of the PRD as an intermediate party holding over 10 percent and a further weakening of the position of the two parties located at either end of the party spectrum are the most important factors affecting anticipated voting trends.

Despite the sudden decline in their leader's popularity, the democratic reformists went up about 1 point and garnered about two-thirds of the electorate that voted for them on 6 October 1985. The APU and the CDS, however, do not appear able to halt the continuous decline in their share of the votes, which is currently only half of what each of these parties obtained in the last legislative elections.



## Key:


1. 28.9 in October 1985
2. 21.0 in October 1985
3. 18.3 in October 1985
4. 16.0 in October 1985
5. 9.9 in October 1985
6. 26.3 in October 1985





## Eanes: Short-Lived Prominence

The peak of popularity (35 percent) registered for Ramalho Eanes in November was short-lived. The new PRD leader only benefited temporarily from the favorable opinion of an indecisive segment of the electorate, when he decided to become president of the reformists. The support was temporary, and Ramalho Eanes was unable to consolidate it. In the brief period of 1 month, the PRD president lost precisely the same 10 points he had gained, which had made him the most popular opposition leader.

Eanes now has Constancio with a percentage in the polls very close to his. The PS leader showed a small increase of 2 points this month and seems to have put an end to the rapid and sharp decline of his image (you will recall that Vitor Constancio lost 15 points in November). The Socialist leader's 23 percent, however, is still well below Socialist Party votes (32.4 percent), whereas Ramalho Eanes' 25 percent is nearly double the support for the PRD (12.4 percent).

Neither Adriano Moreira nor Alvaro Cunhal received their usual percentages. The Christian Democratic leader was clearly ahead of his party, and Alvaro Cunhal maintained a stable image and showed himself to be about as popular as the Communists. Cunhal's public image is the best defined of all the leaders (only one-third of those polled were indecisive), as well as being the least affected by political events, as we have seen this month following the series of conflicts between the PCP and the MDP.





Key:

- 1. May
- 2. June
- 3. July
- 4. August
- 5. September
- 6. October
- 7. November
- 8. December
- 9. President of the Republic
- 10. Prime Minister
- 11. Government
- 12. Assembly of the Republic
- 13. Very good/good
- 14. Poor/very poor
- 15. So-so
- 16. Positive balance

## Soares and Cavaco Over 50 Percent

Mario Soares is back in first place with one of his best showings in this first year as president. He also saw his popularity rise in the last few months of 1986, apparently as a result of a calm period which did not require much political action. There are virtually no negative opinions of his performance, which shows a general consensus on the part of the electorate that Soares will have a hard time maintaining once he finds himself forced to make more important political moves.

Cavaco Silva is now 3 points behind the president, but still over 50 percent, having shown well in the popularity polls throughout 1986, like the president. The prime minister has kept his November ratings virtually unchanged, after having passed the test of the parliamentary budget debate and having been forced to withdraw the major options of the plan.

The government for its part has not managed to improve its image, but neither has it worsened. It continues around 30 percent, well below its prime minister and with a positive balance of only 17 points. The Assembly of the Republic has already seen a further decline of its image, coinciding once again with a period in which it is more active in the eyes of the public. The report of the budget debate and political conflicts which have taken place in the assembly have had a negative influence on voters' opinions: there was a 4-point increase in negative opinions and a 2-point decrease in favorable views, making it the only federal government organ with a negative balance (-2 points).

9805/6091  
CSO: 3542/35

**OPINION POLL SHOWS SLIGHT RISE FOR PS**

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 19-23 Dec 86 p 10

[Text] The Socialist Party could significantly improve its electoral showing in the current legislative elections, according to a Plurieste survey conducted by O JORNAL.

The poll was conducted in urban and rural areas of Lisbon, Oporto, Braga, Beja and Guarda by direct interviews, using the method described in the box entitled "Methodology."

The survey included 600 interviews (200 in Lisbon and 100 in each of the other areas), but the results cannot be extrapolated to a national level, and should be interpreted with extreme caution.


To the question: "What party did you vote for in the October 1985 legislative elections?" only 3.7 percent of those polled claimed to have voted for the CDS, 27.8 percent for the PSD, 23.8 percent for the PS, 10.8 percent for the PRD and 9.8 percent for the APU, while 13.3 percent chose not to disclose the way they had voted.

On the basis of this sampling, there is a tremendous rise in those not answering--from 13.3 percent to 20.8 percent--and an increase for the PS from 23.8 to 27 percent. All the other parties went down slightly.

Were legislation elections to be held now, the PS would receive 27 percent of the vote and the PSD 26.2 percent, with the other political parties showing a relative decline.

The bar chart shows the differences between shares of votes in the 1985 legislative elections (left-hand columns) and the anticipated votes at present (right-hand columns). In the case of the APU, the current anticipated votes for the PCP and the MDP are combined with the APU. This chart shows a large increase in the percentage of undecided or non-answering voters (NR), and a slight decrease in non-voters (NV).

An analysis of the results reported locally shows a considerable distortion in the Beja region, where 37 percent reported to have voted PS and only 26 claimed a preference for the APU.



NR = do not know/no answer; NV = not voting; OUTR = other parties

**Key:**

1. Legislative elections of October 1985
2. How they would vote today

In any case, there appears to be a decline in the PSD in Lisbon and a rise of the PS in the same area. The Socialists showed a sharp increase in Oporto, where the reformists experienced their greatest decline in the polls. As for the APU, they went down in all the regions covered by this Pluriteste/O JORNAL poll.

In general, the CDS would lose 0.5 percent, the PSD 1.6 percent, the PRD 1.8 percent and the APU 3.3 percent (counting the anticipated votes for the APU, PCP and MDP together). The PS would be the only one to record an increase, moving up 3.2 percentage points.

**Methodology**

This poll was taken between 26 November and 11 December, and covered both the urban and rural areas in the districts of Lisbon, Oporto, Guarda, Braga and Beja at 76 sampling points scattered in 24 locations selected randomly.

Households were selected by the Random Route method, while persons to be interviewed in each household were chosen by a double-entry random method (Kish method).

When either nobody was at home or the persons to be interviewed were absent, at least two contacts were made before replacing the household by another.

A team of 35 interviewers was responsible for the 600 personal, direct interviews (second visits to 20 percent) that made up the sampling. In accordance with Pluritest, the degree of reliability of this poll is 95 percent and the margin of error is approximately 4 percent. O JORNAL is responsible for interpreting the results.

9805/6091  
CSO: 3542/35

**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS PREDICTED FOR OCTOBER 1987**

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 15 Jan 87 p 1

[Text] The PSD is beginning to prepare for general elections that, it is predicted, will be held in October owing to the latent crisis between the government and the assembly of the Republic. At the same time, the constitutional revision seems to be a factor that will force the PSD to seek a majority of deputies in the Assembly.

PSD secretary general Dias Loureiro admitted in private that October would be the ideal month for holding elections.

On the other hand, circles close to Freitas do Amaral acknowledged that he is abiding by his agreement with Cavaco Silva and is prepared to participate in the list of PSD deputies, although as an independent. If that should occur, Freitas do Amaral could later assume the presidency of the Assembly of the Republic and, in 1991, become a candidate for the presidency, supported by the PSD.

Along with Freitas do Amaral, the PSD lists could also include Morais Leitao, Proenca de Carvalho, and other prominent figures that participated in Freitas do Amaral's campaign for the presidency of the Republic. Dias Loureiro could have admitted that the PSD had also invited personalities from the Democratic Left, such as university professor Eduardo Prado Coelho, to participate in its lists to give them representation from the Portuguese political center.

As for the PRD, in an interview granted to a Greek newspaper, Ramalho Eanes admitted that his party will get only 10 percent of the votes but he considers that, even so, it will remain in an important position in Portuguese political life because, one day, the PRD may be able to govern together with Vitor Constancio's Socialists.

It is admitted that in forthcoming elections many Communist Party votes would go to the PS inasmuch as this party will be the only alternative to Cavaco Silva's effort to gain the majority in parliament. If that should be the case, the government will intensify the presentation of laws in parliament to prove that the latter does not let it govern or carry out its program.

As for Mario Soares, he will have no alternative but to call elections, because he has already declared that he will not sponsor presidentialist governments. A PSD-PRD majority is not regarded as a possibility inasmuch as it would have to have the support of the PCP. At the same time, this government would have against it in the opposition the largest Portuguese party, with an aura of a policy of successes.

So the holding of early elections in October appears to have been decided, which demands that the parties begin to prepare their election campaigns in a short while.

8711/9312  
CSO: 3542/51

## MODERATE LEFT SEEN AS MINORITY IN LEFTIST SPECTRUM

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 24 Jan 87 p 8

[Article by Jose Pacheco Pereira: "The Inconvenient Effect of the Truth"]

[Text] It is now a year since Mario Soares defeated his opponents to the Left, M.L. Pintasilgo and Salgado Zenha, in the first round of the presidential elections. Political events since then have made this anniversary inconvenient and it is worth trying to elucidate the roots of that inconvenience.

Mario Soares' victory in the first round revealed that, in the overall Center-Left and Left electorate, the moderate sector is the majority in relative terms, even though by a small margin. In absolute terms, however, it is clearly in the minority, with the rest of the Left adding up 28 percent of the votes versus the 25 percent received by Mario Soares.

Contained in those figures is a reality of weighty consequences: more than 7 percent of the Portuguese voted for a candidate such as M.L. Pintasilgo who, in any other European country, would be in the Far-Left (incidentally, just as they had voted for Otelo in 1976 in appreciable percentage), and 21 percent for the candidate supported by the PCP and for a strange party headed by a strange military man.

This is the electoral reality of the Left and last year's election revealed it in its inner structure and nothing indicates that the inner composition has been substantially altered. Developments of the past year reveal that Mario Soares' victory was not enough to alter the strength of a Left changed little in the mythic components of its identity though it may have done so in its intellectual discourse.

Moreover, the inherent weakness of Soares' candidacy in the overall Left would make the second round inevitable, the perverse effects of which would make it difficult to consolidate the political gains of the first. That is the dilemma of the Moderate and Liberal left in Portugal (and not only here) and it has not yet escaped from it.

The great merit of Soares in the first round was to have won it exactly as he was--moderate, open to modernism, Atlantic-oriented, anticomunist, little given to the excesses of Socialism, and having just emerged from an arduous, difficult, and not very popular government experience; and although his maligning adversaries may say that Soares' essence is his multiplicity, at the most difficult moment in his political career he demonstrated great inner courage in being what he was, and it was enough.

The "effect of the truth" of this situation made the election result clear, because everyone knew what he was voting for, and the strength of numbers became effectively revealing. The main victim in the ideological struggle was M.L. Pintasilgo and, at the political party level, the PCP.

It was understandable that the PS should want to recover voters lost in October, part of whom supported the candidacies of Pintasilgo and Zenha. But in doing so, it assumed the positions of the candidacies hostile to Soares, took a great step backwards, squandering the political capital gained with the victory in the "primaries" of the Left.

It is for that very reason that between those two Januarys the brain-washing machine put into operation by the defeated Left is trying to erase that first round and the differences that explain it. As a leader of M.L. Pintasilgo campaign declared, the Convention of the Democratic Left would be "square-one," where everything would start anew.

Immediately in the second round, the PCP was clearly able to regain part of what it had lost and to avoid the worst consequences in the short term. Immediately afterwards, it was rewarded with the end of a party isolation that had lasted almost a decade, and today it sees the PS parliamentary bloc in the Assembly of the Republic acting zealously in its interests. Some of Zenha's principal defenders, who had left the PS inveighing against the party and Mario Soares, were received warmly, as if that attitude of theirs had enhanced their record in the party. On the side of Salgado Zenha's candidacy, only Eanes and the PRD suffer the consequences of the January 1986 defeat.

There remain the "Pintasilguistas," and with them matters are more complicated because, with M.L. Pintasilgo having gone from everything to nothing, "Pintasilguism" is more than a political movement; and that "more" enabled them to make a transmutation to the PS through the Convention of the Democratic Left.

The recovery of "Pintasilguism" is a serious demonstration of the fragility of the political culture of the Left and of the PS in particular.

Meanwhile, we hope that someone remembers that a year ago Mario Soares had just won the elections.

8711/9312  
CSO: 3542/51

**PUBLIC'S FAVORABLE PERCEPTION OF PRIME MINISTER**

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Jan 87 p 3

[Text] In a poll on the performance of the ministers published in this newspaper a week ago, a strange coincidence was observed: the members of the government, without exception, were classified as "so-so."

What can this mean?

That the majority of the persons interviewed really thinks that the performance of all the ministers has not been good or bad, but "so-so?"

Perhaps not.

Perhaps the country is simply poorly informed about the activities of each ministry and for that reason has had difficulty in expressing itself clearly on the subject, preferring to take refuge in an evasive answer.

Be that as it may, what is worth noting is that the Portuguese do not have a very enthusiastic idea about the members of the government.

Moreover, the same occurs with regard to the Executive as a whole, whose performance is also no better than fair, according to the majority of those questioned.

But if that is true, how can one then explain the fact that the PSD receives a vote of over 40 percent in the same poll?

How to explain the fact that the same people who do not attribute great merit to this government then express their intention to vote precisely for the party responsible for the government in the next elections?

Apparently the fact is inexplicable.

But only apparently.

In fact, in the inquiry we have been referring to more than half of those interviewed also said that the prime minister has performed "well" or "very well."

And this datum explains everything.

On its basis, one perceives that what interests the country above all is the image that the leader projects.

The Portuguese are not much interested in knowing if the members of the government are good or bad, and when questioned about that give vague answers.

They are even not very interested in knowing if the performance of the Executive as a whole has been good, bad, or so-so.

What the Portuguese care about above all is the idea they have of the prime minister, and that is enough for them to decide who to vote for.

Not being typically Portuguese, that phenomenon merits some reflection.

On that basis, one concludes that it is not decisive for a political party to have a credible and qualified leadership team vis-a-vis public opinion.

That is not necessary (or it can even be counterproductive) to have several top-level figures, inasmuch as that contributes to diverting the attention that should be centered on the principal figure.

The best way for a party to achieve good results is the one the PSD has found: a strong leader who clearly relegates all of his collaborators to a secondary level.

Contrary to what may be thought, it is not bad for the Social Democratic Party to have the country say that its ministers are so-so.

This confers a prominent and undisputed place to the prime minister, which is then directly projected in the party's vote.

8711/9312  
CSO: 3542/51

**AZORES' MOTA AMARAL'S FORTUNES SEEN WANING**

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 13 Jan 87 p 4

[Article by Nuno Ribeiro: "Mota Amaral: the Star Dims"]

[Excerpts] For years, the former National Assembly deputy constituted a veritable reserve. His name was insistently mentioned in connection with various positions, from almost certain prime minister to candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. Two thousand kilometers away from Lisbon, in mid-Atlantic, Mota Amaral went on prudently gambling and waiting. Now, in little less than 3 months, his star has dimmed.

Mota Amaral tries to appear uninterested, although he manages to raise corners of the veil. "I live from day to day," he told reporters, stressing that "as for the future, we shall see," but adding that "there are very interesting tasks in Portugal and out there"; a discourse for all tastes, with the necessary variants and...purposely, not closing doors and committing himself to outcomes.

What more can one guess behind an enigmatic personality, who dresses in bland color combinations; unimpeachable, according to some; paternalistic, according to others; responsible, according to still others; with a past and present of adaptation, according to his critics?

They say that he has a sense of humor and, while it is true that at the meeting with reporters he demonstrated sarcasm in some answers, more revealing was the way he spoke...without talking about some hot subjects, seeming like a prompter in a theater, who drops phrases, raising questions as if his interlocutors knew the text, knew the play.

"He knows the situation very well," say his faithful. "He has a huge machine," add his opponents, referring to the organizations where he has been and where he remains, from the ANP to "Opus Dei."

"The PSD is Dr Mota Amaral's party and the PSD men who are from Opus Dei are Dr Mota Amaral's confidants," remarked Decq Nota.

"He has complete power; controls everything," says Roberto Amaral: "executive, legislative, the public sector, the public enterprises--everything is in the hands of the PSD," he continues, concluding that "this is not a democratic system."

Despite the lobby and the control of information that, according to the opposition, mark the presence of the PSD, Mota Amaral's star has dimmed for other reasons.

In assuming his "crossing" with the FLA independentists as an open secret, the president of the Regional Government caused surprise. And despite having declared energetically that "we are not a territory of Portugal but Portugal, here," in the opinion of his opposition, this is the lowest point in the Azorean leader's political career.

#### Separatism: Offspring of the Situation of the Moment

In a complex network of influences, which include interests related to reequipping the Armed Forces through a greater share of the money "pie" derived from Lajes, and the contradictions between the PSD in the Azores and Lisbon, Mota Amaral was defeated precisely by the "crossing" with the FLA resurrected by Jose de Almeida's statements.

It is the reaffirmation that separatism appears as the product of the situation of the moment. While in 1975 it was used in the Azores and in Continental Portugal by those who opposed the political developments, exploiting the aspirations stifled by decades of political-administrative centralism and ostracism, its use to reinforce mere accounting purposes and immediate political party interest is certainly paradoxical.

8711/9312  
CSO: 3542/51

**PCP's STATEMENTS, PS-PCP ALLIANCE, DIALOGUE REVIEWED**

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Jan 87 p 26R

[Article by Eduardo Prado Coelho]

[Text] The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) met last 16 January and, after examining the political situation, issued the following communique: "It is time for all political and social forces that oppose the government to intensify the struggle for its resignation, and for the parties of the Democratic opposition, which constitutes the majority in the Assembly of the Republic, to fully assume their responsibilities, not limiting themselves to saying 'no' to more or less grievous and significant aspects of government policy, but seriously committing themselves to seeking, preparing, and achieving the roads that will lead to a democratic alternative." This implies that the PS and the PRD abandon "indecision, hesitation, and fear," because, in the opinion of the PCP, "the Cavaco Silva Executive is pursuing a policy of subversion of the democratic system."

It may be said that this text does not say anything new, and that is true. But it is part of a campaign in which the "soft water" of certain statements is trying to shatter the "hard rock" of certain political strategies. It is for that reason that it merits our attention. In some way, it synthesizes the central elements of a "frenzied discourse" that may contaminate the Portuguese opposition. In the first place, I believe it would be advisable for us to become accustomed to thinking that it is desirable for governments to govern for the period of time for which they were legitimately elected. Only very exceptional circumstances should cause this normal situation to be altered. Because only that will permit the consistent development of certain basic policies, and because only in that way can the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of those politicians be strictly judged by the regular election process.

It is true that the PCP advances an argument: this Executive "pursues a policy of subversion of the democratic system." No more, nor less. We have to remember that the PCP has said that of almost all the governments and that constant "crying wolf" ends up becoming ridiculous.

But the strangest thing is saying that the government is subverting the democratic system when the party that sustains that government is rising in

every known poll. Does this mean that such a large part of the Portuguese people seeks to subvert the democratic system?

We get into another order of argument when the opposition openly criticizes certain measures, policies, and positions of the government. It does so completely legitimately and many times correctly. But I emphasize that such facts can only represent cause for satisfaction for that opposition, which should say to itself: "It's a good thing that the Right in power commits mistakes and loses opportunities because that means that the Left will be able to win the next elections easily. Let us give it the time and opportunity to make even more mistakes, without apologies..." If what the opposition says today is true, that opposition can rub its hands in glee: it is saving for the future.

Let us turn to another point. Would there not be the possibility, without elections, of succeeding in forming a PS-PRD government with the parliamentary support of the PCP? Is that opportunity not being lost by "indecision, hesitation, and fear?"

Let us be clear once more. Rapprochement by the PS with the PCP is difficult because in terms of political philosophy and program, they have almost nothing in common; The opposition of the PS to the PRD is difficult because in terms of political philosophy and program, they have almost everything in common. What is lacking within the opposition is what could be called a "good distance." And that is why this time is not a good time.

It is obvious that there is an almost total difference between the PS and the PCP. They could hardly reach an understanding that would not be an opportunistic sham of an understanding. It is not worth reciting the litany of differences here. The first and pivotal one is that they do not even agree on the definition of democracy. The PCP continues to designate as "democratic parties" (see the above-quoted communique) the MDP, the PRD, the PS, and itself. It excludes the PSD and the CDS from the area of democracy (that is, an enormous part of the electorate). The PS considers that all these parties (including the PCP) belong to the democratic area.

It is obvious that the similarity between the PS and the PRD is almost complete. The PRD today cannot present a single, perceptible theoretical or ideological difference. The PRD had its own logic when it tried to replace a PS that was considered politically inappropriate to the circumstances. The PRD loses its own logic when it tries to coexist with the PS. If it exists today, it is basically by that Spinozist principle that "every being tends to persevere in its being." It exists simply because it has already begun to exist. That is what makes rapprochement with the PS difficult. How can two parties collaborate when each sees the most logical possibility of its own strengthening on the basis of the weakening of the other?

That leaves the issue of dialogue to talk about.

It is true that the Cavaco Silva government opted for an attitude of intransigence in the defense of its positions. It did so perhaps in the

conviction that that would bring advantages and prestige after a period in which the image of political life had been polluted by an interminable sequence of compromises, negotiations, concessions, and extortions. It may have gained some benefits by adopting that line. However, it erred completely when it tried to involve the PRD in that field of arrogance. At that moment, the ambiguity disappeared.

On the opposition side, it manifestly overdid things in attempting to obstruct every government initiative, which aroused movements of political rashness or thoughtlessness of incalculable cost. Independently of reasons of positive assessment of the Radio Law bill, we must recognize that the political balance-sheet of the operation will not be a brilliant one if it results in a situation in which the president of the republic and the cardinal patriarch appear at the side of Cavaco Silva. It can even be said that it was the great Christmas present from the opposition to the PSD.

In the meantime, there are mutual signs at this time that dialogue is possible. Dialogue that does not aim at blurring differences (no man of the Left will be able to politically support a government that aims to dominate the Right), but the definition of the rules of the game that will permit clarification of the differences.

On this point, we can only admit that Vitor Constancio has been mapping out a correct strategy. Nevertheless, some Socialist discourse superimposed on it arouses obvious dissonant effects by its sectarianism or impatience. That is precisely what Jaime Gama must have wanted to say in the important interview granted to Maria Joao Avillez: "I refer to the not very exact and excessively rapid sequence between reviving the idea of bipolarization, the merit of minority governments, and the defense of a regime agreement without constitutional content." Which also means that no "reactive and emotional logic" should divert the dispassionate and calm line of the only strategy that can lead to victory.

8711/7687  
CSO: 3542/50

## POLL RESULTS ON POLITICAL PARTIES' POPULARITY

Madrid YA PANORAMA in Spanish 25 Jan 87 pp 25-26

[Text] According to the polls taken by the Gallup Institute, if a new electoral contest were held this Sunday, the distribution of seats in Parliament would vary very little, despite the major political events that have taken place since the general elections.

At the present time, the majority of Spaniards would vote again for PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], and AP [Popular Alliance] would remain as a majority opposition party, 11 points ahead of CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] (Table No 1).

(1)	Resultados	Encuestas
	elecciones	Gallup (2)
	22 Junio 1986	Dic. 1987
	%	%
PSOE .....	44,3	42,1
AP .....	26,1	23,1
PDP (3).....	26,1	0,6
PL (4).....	26,1	0,4
CDS .....	9,3	11,6
IU (5).....	4,6	5,1
UC (6).....	1,1	2,2
PRD (7).....	1,0	0,4
Nacionalistas Vascos (8)		
PNV (9).....	1,5	1,1
HB (10).....	1,2	1,0
EE (11).....	0,5	0,6
EA (12).....	—	0,4
Nacionalistas Catalanes (13)		
CIU (14).....	5,1	4,8
ERC (15).....	0,4	0,6
Otros votantes (16)		
(1) Partidos regionalistas (17)	1,6	2,1
Otros partidos (18).....	3,5	3,9
(1) Partidos regionalistas (19)		
CG/PAR/PA/UPN/UV		

## Key to Table 1:

1. Election results, 22 Jun 1986
2. Gallup polls, Dec 1987
3. Popular Democratic Party
4. Liberal Party

5. United Left
6. Communist Unity
7. Democratic Reformist Party
8. Basque Nationalists
9. Basque Nationalist Party
10. Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity]
11. Euskadiko Eskerra [Basque Left]
12. Eskerra Abertzale [Patriotic Left]
13. Catalonian Nationalists
14. Convergence and Unity
15. Republican Left of Catalonia
16. Other voters
17. Regionalist parties
18. Other parties
19. Regionalist parties: CG/PAR/PA/UPN/UV

#### **PSOE Retains the Majority**

The last 3 months of running the government have entailed for PSOE an erosion reflected in a decline of 2.4 percent of the valid votes in voting intentions. Nevertheless, PSOE retains its wide majority, having the support of 42.1 percent of the voters.

As shown on the table on voting transfers (Table No 2), 80 percent of PSOE's voters still retain their option of June 1986.

During the past few years, the voting for PSOE has been shown to be a structural vote which remains loyal, despite cyclical matters as significant as the NATO referendum, the high unemployment rate, the industrial reconversions, the government's foreign policy, or its economic policy. Apart from electoral promises, more or less bold or more or less successful, PSOE has procured popular support for carrying out a plan for administrative and economic reform which, in the opinion of most Spaniards, requires at least two legislatures. This is why it has been kept virtually constant in the electorate's preferences, despite mistakes or unkept promises.

But, although the majority of the PSOE electorate has remained loyal, PSOE, like the other parties in the Western democracies, has suffered flights of voters to other options, and has received new backing from voters who had previously selected a different offer.

Thus, it should be pointed out that of those who would now cast their vote for PSOE in new general elections, 10 percent are former abstentionists; 5 percent, new voters; and 2 percent from CP [Popular Coalition]; while 1 percent voted for CDS, and another 1 percent, for the left.

#### **AP Remains a Majority Opposition Party**

This series of polls taken by Gallup was carried out during the final quarter of 1986, when the Spanish right was undergoing one of the most serious crises

of the last decade, after a break in the coalition pacts by Oscar Alzaga's PDP and the flight toward the Mixed Group of 21 Christian Democratic deputies; the subsequent abandonment of AP by Jorge Verstringe, Carlos Manglano, Gabriel Camunas, and Carlos Ruiz Soto y Olarra; AP's very poor results in the Basque elections; Fraga's resignation; and, finally, the end of the AP-PL unity; all surrounded by statements, constant appearances on the media, and the resultant atmosphere of disunity, personalism, intraparty disputes, and, ultimately, crisis. It was to be expected that this situation would be reflected in a sharp decline in intentions to vote for AP; however, AP has lost only 518,000 votes since the last elections.

The conservative Spanish electorate is awaiting the settlement of the crisis. Whether or not AP emerges successfully from this important juncture will affect the configuration of the Spanish political map during the next few years. If AP manages to attune itself to an electorate most of which assumes central positions on the political scale, it may be able to recover that half a million votes and will continue to be the majority opposition party. Otherwise, that is, if AP takes a stand at its next congress as a hard right group, and errs in the selection of its new leaders, it will continue to lose votes; which will make it possible for other more moderate options to progress, becoming the alternative to PSOE, while AP would be left as a small party to the right of the political spectrum.

#### Popular Support for PDP and PL Is Virtually Non-Existent

Only 114,000 Spaniards would vote for PDP, and 86,000 for PL; which, considering the fact that these parties are competing in the entire national territory, means that they do not have the slightest chance of procuring a single seat.

Upon demarcating themselves from AP, PDP and PL are competing for the same electorate as CDS, which for over 4 years has engaged in an effective effort for consolidation and entrenchment, which has enabled it to occupy the central part of the political spectrum solidly.

Therefore, PDP and PL lack space between AP and CDS; a problem that is exacerbated in those regions where there are strong nationalist or regionalist parties. To be added to this lack of a differentiated offer, is the lack of leaders and of credibility.

#### UC and IU Rise Slightly

The state parties located left of PSOE have moved from 5.7 to 7.3 percent of the valid votes.

UC has a higher percentage of fixed votes than United Left does; on the other hand, the latter has greater ease in attracting votes from PSOE, as well as in mobilizing the abstention group and gleaning new voters.

## Increase for CDS

CDS has moved from 9.3 to 11.6 percent of the valid votes. Since its founding, CDS has undergone a slow but steady increase, which became accelerated after June 1982, when CDS appeared as a real offer. CDS has one of the assets most esteemed by the electorate: a strong leadership. If it succeeds in proving that it is capable of offering wise and effective solutions, it will be in a position to pick up the votes that CP would lose. In the event that AP should fail to resolve its crisis successfully, then it would have the opportunity to become the major party of the Spanish right of center. Otherwise, that is, if AP becomes concentrated and manages to become attuned to its real and potential market, the latter would be the main force to oppose PSOE; but even in this instance, the role played by CDS would be extraordinarily important.

Noteworthy in the transfers of votes to CDS is its capacity for picking up votes from both the left and the right. For example, we observe that, of the total number polled who declare their intention of voting for CDS, 3.5 percent voted for the state left in the last general elections; 8.5 percent, for PSOE; 10 percent, for CP; and 8.3 percent abstained; while 6.7 percent did not vote because they had not yet reached adulthood.

## Parliament Is Not Representative

The data from the Gallup poll show greater stability among the voters than among politicians. If one adds to the data the fact that the "useful vote" favors the best situated groups on the eve of elections, it becomes clearly evident that the poll results are a repetition of the results of 22 June 1986. Despite the extensive political mobility during the past few months, the decline in the opposition's parliamentary activity, and the constant increase in the Mixed Group, with its series of divisions, desertions, and personalism, the electorate has remained constant, the only new aspect being the moderate rise in CDS' electoral expectations.

A 2-point rise, less than taken for granted by commentators, appears, at the moment, obviously insufficient for attaining the goal of becoming a government alternative. If Fraga had a clear limit, it seems obvious that Adolfo Suarez has a limit too; and that the day is far off when a comparison can be made with PSOE.

Another obvious conclusion is that the voters give Popular Alliance a vote of confidence, despite the senseless line of some of its leaders. And it shows, categorically, that the Popular Coalition was Popular Alliance. PDP and PL have not procured parliamentary representation by a long shot. It is likely that this was influenced by a certain amount of ignorance of those options on the part of the voters; but it is clear that their parliamentary representative status at present has been inflated with regard to their electoral expectations.

And this is one of the most serious conclusions from the very interesting Gallup poll: the very lack of attunement between the present reality of Parliament and the reality on the street; or, more directly, the voters have not

voted for the Mixed Group. The voters' common sense appears to be more common than that of the politicians. The voters maintain signs of stability, while instability prevails among the politicians.

Although it may seem a harsh statement, the poll reflects the fact that Parliament is not representative. In Italy, they are reportedly already talking about early elections.

#### Technical Record

Sample: 1,994 individuals; accumulation, October and December.

Scope: peninsula and Balearic Islands

Universe: Spaniards aged 15 years and over

Interviews: personal, in the residence of those interviewed

Selection: aleatory, using the "random route" method for selection of the household, and the "Kish" method for that of the person interviewed


Sampling points: 120 localities distributed at random after prior sample stratification based on regions and habitats

Field work: 19-21 October, 17-23 December

Margin of error:  $\pm 3.2$  percent for a confidence level of 95.4 percent, and  $p = q = 50$  percent

Analysis methodology: Starting with direct data, the undecided were assigned to the different parties based on weighting indexes which correct the concealed vote or the over-rating of certain political parties.

Institution responsible for the research: Gallup, Inc, Spanish member of the Gallup International Organization.



Key to Graph 1.

1. Democratic Center Union
2. Spanish Socialist Workers Party
3. Spanish Communist Party/United Left + Community Unity
4. Popular Alliance/Popular Coalition
5. Basque Nationalist Party/Convergence and Unity/other regionalist parties
6. Popular Unity/Basque Left/Republican Left of Catalonia
7. 1979 general elections
8. 1982 general elections
9. 1986 general elections
10. Party support, Sep-Oct 86
11. Party support, Oct-Dec 86

«Las próximas elecciones se celebrarán el año 1990. Suponiendo que se celebrasen mañana, (1) ¿a qué partido o líder votaría usted?»										
	(2) REALES			(3) HIPOTESIS GALLUP			(3) HIPOTESIS GALLUP			
	(4)	(5)	(6)	1.647	1.647	1.483	1.994	1.994	1.687	
	Miles	% censo	% válidos	Miles	% censo	% válidos	Miles	% censo	% válidos	
{(7)} UC .....	226	0.8	1.1	399	1.4	2.1	426	1.5	2.2	
{(8)} IU .....	930	3.3	4.6	654	2.3	3.5	1.024	3.6	5.1	
{(9)} PSOE .....	8.887	31.1	44.3	8.357	29.3	44.4	8.670	30.4	42.1	
{(10)} CDS .....	1.863	6.5	9.3	1.911	6.7	10.1	2.391	8.4	11.6	
{(11)} PRD .....	194	0.7	1.0	114	0.4	0.7	86	0.3	0.4	
{(12)} PDP .....	—	—	—	86	0.3	0.4	114	0.4	0.6	
{(13)} CP PL .....	5.245	18.4	26.1	56	0.2	0.3	86	0.3	0.4	
{(14)} P. Nacionalistas Vascos .....	—	—	—	4.820	16.9	25.5	4.763	16.7	23.1	
Nacionalistas Vascos {(15)}	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
{(16)} PNV .....	309	1.1	1.5	100	0.7	1.2	227	0.8	1.1	
{(17)} EA .....	—	—	—	171	0.6	0.9	86	0.3	0.4	
{(18)} EEA .....	232	0.8	1.2	171	0.6	0.8	199	0.7	1.0	
{(19)} EE .....	107	0.4	0.5	56	0.2	0.3	115	0.4	0.6	
Nacionalistas Catalanes {(20)}	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
{(21)} CIU .....	1.012	3.6	5.1	1.027	3.6	5.4	996	3.5	4.8	
{(22)} ERC .....	84	0.3	0.4	56	0.2	0.2	115	0.4	0.6	
{(23)} P. regionalistas .....	328	1.1	1.8	268	0.9	1.3	370	1.3	2.1	
Otros partidos {(24)}	641	2.0	3.5	576	2.0	2.9	822	2.8	3.9	
Abstención {(25)}	8.465	29.9	—	9.612	33.7	—	8.033	28.2	—	
TOTAL .....	28.623	100	100	28.523	100	100	28.523	100	100	
(26) ELECCIONES GENERALES 88				ENCUESTAS SEPTIEMBRE/OCTUBRE 1988 (27)			ENCUESTAS OCTUBRE/DICIEMBRE 1988 (28)			
(II) Partidos regionalistas CG/PAR/PA/UPN/UV (29)										

**Key to Table 2:**

1. "The next elections will be held in 1990. Supposing they took place tomorrow, for which party or leader would you vote?"
2. Real
3. Gallup hypothesis
4. Thousands
5. % of census
6. % of Valid
7. Communist Unity
8. United Left
9. Spanish Socialist Workers Party
10. Social Democratic Center Party
11. Democratic Reformist Party
12. Popular Democratic Party
13. Popular Coalition, Liberal Party
14. Popular Alliance
15. Basque Nationalists
16. Basque Nationalist Party
17. Patriotic Left
18. Popular Unity
19. Basque Left
20. Catalonian Nationalists
21. Convergence and Unity
22. Republican Left of Catalonia
23. Regionalist parties
24. Other parties
25. Abstention
26. General elections, 1986
27. September/October 1986 polls
28. October/December 1986 polls
29. Regionalist parties: CG/PAR/PA/UPN/UV

2909

CSO: 3548/43

## POLL SHOWS MAJORITY SUPPORT STUDENT PROTEST

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 25 Jan 87 p 15

[Text] Madrid--According to an emergency poll taken by EL PAIS, 67 percent of the population think that the students are more correct in their current protests than the Ministry of Education and Science; and only 18 percent of those polled are of the opinion that the students are not very well informed on the reason for their criticism. On the whole, the population's position favoring the students is distributed homogeneously throughout the entire national territory.

According to the data from the poll, 42 percent of Spaniards think that the student protest is based only on the reasons given for it; while 31 percent of those interviewed believe that, along with these reasons, there are other motives not explained by the students underlying the protest.

According to the poll, most Spanish citizens (68 percent to be exact) think that the student movement cannot be confined to a matter of a few days or weeks. In this respect, 42 percent of those polled believe that the student protests could become heightened and cause serious situations. Insofar as the perception of the seriousness of the conflict is concerned, Madrid (a direct witness to the demonstration on Friday) and the provincial capitals are prominent.

The government's action in the conflict satisfies only one out of every five Spaniards. A relative majority (38 percent of those interviewed) are critical of the government's action, considering it overly harsh; and 15 percent deem it overly lenient. The criticism of the government's severity is greater in Madrid and in the provincial capitals than elsewhere in Spain.

The opinion is virtually unanimous (over 80 percent) that the government should be flexible, negotiating and thereby attempting to put an end to the conflict. In this respect, there is no difference between cities and towns, or between Madrid and the rest of Spain.

Technical Record of the Poll

Conducted by the Demoscopia institution, under the direction of sociologists Rafael Lopez Pintor and Jose Juan Toharia, and based on a national sample of 800 persons over age 18, of both sexes, in municipalities with over 2,000 inhabitants. Confidence level of 95.5 percent, and error of ±3.5 percent, for total data. Final selection of those interviewed in their residences, using the random route system, and fulfilling quotas for sex and age. The interviews were held on Saturday, 24 January.

(1) LA IMPORTANCIA DE LA PROTESTA  
(en porcentaje)

(2)	Total nacional				(3)	(4)
		Madrid	Barce- lona	Conjunto de capitales	Resto de mun- icipios	
Es cuestión de unos días o semanas (5)	25	14	44	24	27	
Es un movimiento de cierta importancia, pero no grave (6)	28	28	18	23	29	
O que puede ir en aumento y crear situaciones graves (7)	42	51	24	44	40	
No sabe / no contesta (8)	7	7	14	9	4	
Total (N=800)	100	100	100	100	100	

(9) QUIÉN TIENE MÁS RAZÓN  
(en porcentaje)

(10)	(2)	Total nacional				(3)	(4)
			Madrid	Barce- lona	Conjunto de capitales	Resto de mun- icipios	
Los estudiantes	67	68	71	66	68		
El Ministerio de Educación (11)	13	10	7	14	12		
No sabe / no contesta (8)	20	22	22	20	20		
Total (N=800)	100	100	100	100	100		

(12) CÓMO ESTÁ ACTUANDO EL GOBIERNO  
(en porcentaje)

(13)	(2)	Total nacional				(3)	(4)
			Madrid	Barce- lona	Conjunto de capitales	Resto de mun- icipios	
Como debe	21	27	7	23	20		
Con demasiada severidad (14)	38	40	29	41	36		
Con demasiada blandura (15)	15	18	18	16	14		
No sabe / no contesta (8)	26	17	46	20	30		
Total (N=800)	100	100	100	100	100		

(16) QUÉ DEBE HACER EL GOBIERNO CON LOS ESTUDIANTES  
(en porcentaje)

(17)	(2)	Total nacional				(3)	(4)
			Madrid	Barce- lona	Conjunto de capitales	Resto de mun- icipios	
Darles todo lo que piden	8	8	13	7	7		
Negociar con ellos y con- cederles lo que estimen ra- zonable (18)	81	84	85	83	81		
Esperar a que las cosas se apacigüen (19)	8	7	—	9	8		
No sabe / no contesta (8)	3	1	2	1	4		
Total (N=800)	100	100	100	100	100		

**Key to Table:**

1. The importance of the protest (in percentage)
2. National total
3. Capitals as a whole
4. Other municipalities
5. It is a matter of a few days or weeks
6. It is a movement with some importance, but not serious
7. It might become heightened and create serious situations
8. Don't know/no answer
9. Who is more correct? (in percentage)
10. The students
11. The Ministry of Education
12. How is the government acting? (in percentage)
13. As it should
14. With too much severity
15. With too much leniency
16. What should the government do with the students? (in percentage)
17. Give them everything they request
18. Negotiate with them and grant them what is deemed reasonable
19. Wait for the situation to calm down

2909

CSO: 3548/43

**MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALIST STUDENTS DISRUPT STAGE PLAY**

**Students Questioned by Police, Released**

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 Dec 86 p 12

[Text] The day before yesterday, two persons went on stage during the matinee performance of "Muzir Muzikal" ["Mischievous Musical"] and claimed that they were "Muslim students." In response to this action, playwright Ferhan Sensoy made a statement yesterday and said, "The Turkish press used us and our play as a target."

Sensoy spoke of the incident, saying:

"This type of action cannot frighten intellectuals. Our prime minister says there is no political reaction in Turkey, yet political reaction appeared on the scene. This is the product of unfounded reports in the press. A Turkish newspaper wrote today that we blaspheme God and saints. When I read the article, I telephoned the paper and asked, "Have you seen our play?" "No," it replied, "That is what we were told." News reports cannot be based on gossip. Countrymen who read the newspaper are convinced that we are infidels. They come to the play with this belief and precipitate this type of incident."

Derya Baykal, who was at the theater during the protester's demonstration, said, "I was petrified, because of their behavior, that the persons who appeared on stage had guns in their belts. We did not know their purpose. The incident is very frightening for Turkey and the arts. If these types of actions are not prevented, the day that we will go to see plays in fear or not go at all will not be far off. This was not a crime; it was terrorism. We want the government and the press to get on top of these situation."

Actor Rasim Ozkin stated that "this was an attack on theater in general."

The day before yesterday, two youths seated in the audience at the 4 o'clock matinee got up and angrily marched on stage. While actors and viewers looked on in astonishment, the youths turned to the audience and shouted, "We are Muslim students. You, too, are Muslims. How can you watch such a play?"

During this, the play stopped, and some members of the audience and the protecting youths exchanged curses. Theater officials, overcoming their surprise, then removed the two youths from the stage and turned them over to the authorities.

After giving a statement to the police, the protesters were released. Following the incident, the performance was resumed. However, in response to warnings and threats that a bomb had been placed in the theater, the police took precautionary security measures in and around the theater.

#### Commentary Calls for Respect of Rights

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 15 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Ergun Goze]

[Text] Recently, there has been a great deal of talk about a particular play. Is this because of its artistic value? The play possesses no such thing. It blasphemes religion, contains the most loathsome jokes. I have received a number of phone calls and letters concerning it from readers.

Let me say first that it is necessary to understand the psychology behind it. Once a person reaches the age of 40 or 50, his attempts to attract attention through obscenities are not insignificant, but are an indication of powerlessness, of maladroitness. The people describe this as being "dumb-struck." This takes place with writers as well. Those who do not have much artistic talent search for other areas to exploit in order to attract attention and audiences. They try unthought-of means, calling them "advertising." They engage in the most excessive behavior.

Thus, it can be understood that this play, too, uses "sacrilege"--in a manner so that it cannot be compared with other plays and so that it will offend everybody--as a box-office play. There have been others who took this path before, who did similar things. I recall a once-famous female playwright who put on the first obscene play in Turkey in order to gain further renown. Her play, which had absolutely no redeeming value, was brought before the court, and the female playwright went on a hunger strike, pitted one judge against another, and engaged in an unbelievable advertising campaign. She went so far that the prosecutor of the case, a dignified gentleman, suffered a heart attack from the malice. What happened later? Look, I am not mentioning her name, for there probably isn't anyone left who remembers it anyway. If I did give her name, probably no one who remembered it would admit it. I do not mean to expose her to public view, but to use her as an example, a warning. Let me continue. This female playwright later went to prison for absolutely no reason. The press was aroused. It cried out, "Is this possible? Can such a severe penalty be imposed for such a thing?" But, those who understood were silent, heeding the warning. Her sentence was not for her current action, but for her past behavior. This is divine justice.

I wish the same thing here. For this play, I would like you to remember:

"Justice is not the sound of a blow, nor is it an arbitrary cure."

Furthermore, one other point upsets me. In our society, the left has always been opposed to religion. It has also used art to destroy religious beliefs. This, too, is perceived within this play, because a "divisive" atmosphere has been created between those who react to the play and those who do not. Furthermore, it demonstrates the ulterior motives of the left, who are campaigning today to repeal Article 163 of the constitution in order to win over the pious.

It can be said. "There is freedom in the nation. Leave it alone. Let them perform the play. Those who wish to see it will. Those who do not, will not. Look at theater in the West. Could this happen there?"

This is true. Very true. However, this cursed thing which is called freedom in the West is recognized for everyone. There, audiences also have rights. Just as they have the right to applaud what they like, they also have the right to hiss, to boo, and even to throw tomatoes and cucumbers on stage if they don't like a play. In fact, they even have the right to demand a refund! There, not everyone can call himself a playwright and say anything that comes to mind on stage. First, he must gain a grip on public opinion. My friends, if those of you who react to a play would not merely leave, but would hiss, boo, and, especially, demand your money back, how greatly could you modify behavior. Everyone has a faith, a belief. It is necessary to know that reputation, money, ideology are the idols of some.

Let me close with an anecdote that expresses the thesis of my article while showing respect for the intelligence and ideas of our theater personnel and for the beliefs and faith of our people.

The late Neyzen Tevfik went to the theater one day. The play was a disgusting disaster, similar to the current play. Everyone started to protest, began to hiss. But Tevfik, alone, applauded. One person, surprised, queried:

"Master, I do not understand why, while everyone is hissing and booing, you are clapping?"

"I am not applauding the actors."

"Then, who are you applauding?"

"Those who are hissing. Those who are booing."

"Yes, my beloved readers. I, too, applaud you.

11673/6662  
CSO: 3554/142

**U.S. HELICOPTER FIRM SEEKS TURKISH PARTNER**

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 10 Nov 86 p 5

[Text] The American aeronautics industrial corporation, Hynes, is looking for a partner in order to manufacture helicopters in Turkey.

Michael Hynes, chairman of the corporation, announced that, through a joint investment with a firm to be established in Turkey, the production of helicopters can begin in 1987. The new corporation will manufacture and market helicopters as well as provide service for them. Meanwhile, helicopter engineers are planning to establish a school to train production workers, pilots, and service technicians.

Officials report that the topic is being discussed by the Turkish and American governments and that Turkish aeronautics technology and the Turkish market are being evaluated. They state that a factory with the capacity to produce all helicopter parts will be built at the first stage. The Hynes firm will contract to transfer complete helicopter technology to Turkey and educate, in the United States, the technicians who will work in the factory in Turkey.

The corporation plans to employ 300 persons at the helicopter factory and to bring four training, prototype helicopters to Turkey in February. Two of these will be the H-2, a two-man, training and transport helicopter. The other two will be the H-5, a five-man, piston-driven helicopter. The H-5, the only kind of its type in the world, will be the first to arrive in Turkey. It has earned certification by the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, has been ordered by 17 nations, and can be used for both military and agricultural purposes.

According to plans that have been drafted, Hynes is prepared to send to Turkey, in addition to the four helicopters, parts for one helicopter each month beginning in May. The helicopters then will be assembled and tested in Turkey. Under the plan, the manufacture of helicopter parts will commence in 1988 leading to the export of helicopters to America and other countries from Turkey.

According to an announcement made by Hynes, officials from Turkish aeronautics organizations believe that helicopters will attain a significant role in military and civilian transport in Turkey within the next 15 years.

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**EDITORIAL ON FUNCTIONS ON CENTRAL BANK**

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 10 Nov 86 p 1

[Text] The "liberalism of 1980" can be criticized from many angles. It, however, also led to positive developments. The chief of these if the Central Bank. The Central Bank is the first and, perhaps, the only institution to comprehend the ned to "reorganize conditions" determined by the attempt to transform the economy following 1980.

The Central Bank's capacity to make this change affects the entire economy, because it has become one of several very important focal points for the administration. In addition, noted experts' chances for success will increase to the degree they are able to take timely action in order to regulate accumulated wealth within a free-market economy.

Various decisions related to fiscal management and foreign-exchange policy can be debated. What is valid for every growing and changing institution is valid for the Central Bank as well. In other words, mistakes and errors can and do occur alongside correct procedures. However, what cannot be disputed is the aptness and correctness of the steps taken by the Central Bank to create a "four-part" monetary and foreign-exchange market.

An "interbank" system was instituted for a brief period, 6 months, in order to regulate the flow of Turkish liras. At this point, the Central Bank is reviewing this system. Banks are able to meet their needs for Turkish liras by making independent decisions in an environment of balanced competition. What any bank does can be clearly observed within an organized market and the monetary exchange through the use of objective criteria. In this way, potential monetary problems have been nipped in the bud and averted to the greatest extent possible.

The Central Bank is preparing to take, within the same framework, a second step termed, "open-market procedures." This market, which will revolve around tools to "create liquidity," such as treasury bonds, state securities, deposit certificates, and guaranteed bank bonds, will become one of the Central Bank's effective forces from the standpoint of ensuring the "dynamic stability" of its monetary policy.

It can be said that much more important aspects of the use of "open-market procedures" as a tool within monetary policy are, on one hand, the placement of "market responsibility" on the banking system and, on another hand, the creation of "transparent liquidity" through stocks and bonds. With this step, the second stage for a contemporary monetary market will be established.

The third level, which will complete the monetary market, is being stalled at the point of foreign exchange. As far as can be understood, the Central Bank administration is not comfortable with the idea of a "foreign interbank" appropriate to economic conditions as far as a "Turkish-lira interbank" and open-market operations are concerned. When making national plans, it prefers to act "more cautiously" in response to various pressures that create uneasiness.

As a matter of fact, it has begun to make preliminary experiments toward this end. For example, the 30 October operation included a requirement that banks observe a specific ratio relative to a requirement that banks observe a specific ratio relative to their foreign-exchange holdings. This was initiated in order to test the ground for a "foreign-exchange interbank" and to foster rationality in banks.

The Central Bank, however, must now allow its position of "prudence" on the topic of a "foreign-exchange interbank" to become one of delay. The 14 March 1986 and 30 October 1986 operations laid the groundwork for an extremely essential type of "strong, but sweet" supervision over banks. The time has come, in order to be able to transform this foundation into an orderly market, to establish a "foreign-exchange interbank."

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## DEVELOPMENTS IN AGRICULTURE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 10 Nov 86 p 2

[Article by Tevfik Gungor]

[Text] Professor Dr Merih Celasun, chairman of the METU [Middle East Technical University] Economics Department, worked for the State Planning Organization from 1964 to 1969. While Turgut Ozal was undersecretary, Celasun served as chairman of the Economic Planning Office and participated in work on the program and plan. He later did research for the World Bank for a period of time and, upon his return to Turkey, chose to work in academics at METU.

Celasun continues to conduct studies of the Turkish economy for the World Bank. Because nearly all his research is prepared in English, Celasun is not well-known in Turkey. Most of his work, however, has been published abroad in books or articles, and a portion of it has appeared in METU publications.

His most recent study, "Income Distribution and Domestic Terms of Trade in Turkey, 1978-1983: Estimated Measures of Inequality and Poverty," can be found on pages 193-216 of the METU Studies in Development journal, issue No 13 (1, 2) 1986.

In this article Celasun summarizes results of economic-model studies that have been expanded by the use of computers, and he provides figures and explanations for developments in income distribution in Turkey between 1973 and 1983.

Over the next 3 days, we will, in this column, encapsulate the results of Celasun's studies and use his findings to interpret and simplify, in tables, developments in income distribution in Turkey.

As is known, national income figures provide a monetary value for goods and services produced in a country during a year.

National income figures are the same as figures for "value added." Stated simply, they are the gross national product minus production expenses. In other words, they are the total price for products and services created by adding up wages, interest, rents, depreciation, and profits.

An increase in national income means an increase in value added. An increase in total added value, however, does not mean there has been a categorical increase in wages. The increase could have resulted from an increase in interest payments or in profit-taking.

An increase in national income in a country (an increase in added value) does not mean there has been growth in every sector. Any sector can create more value added than another sector for a number of reasons. Therefore, a sector whose value added is lower than another's becomes poorer in relation to a sector that has made gains in value added.

When examining developments in income distribution, the percentage of increase in sectors and segments of sectors relative to gains in total added value is termed, "differences in productivity."

Writers such as Kuznets (1966) and Chenery and Syquin (1975), who study national income figures, determine differences in value added or, more simply, differences in productivity on a per-capita basis in various countries.

What is the difference in productivity between sectors? What do these differences mean?

Per-capita productivity in agriculture can be 1 while that in other sectors can be 3. This can be the result of two different factors. The agricultural sector may not have made progress, or both the agriculture sector and sectors other than agriculture may have developed, but productivity (value added) in agriculture may have been lower.

No matter what the reason, it is important to evaluate differences in productivity between the agricultural sector and the other-than-agriculture sector. In 1966, Kuznets found an average difference of 2.37 in various nations. In 1983, Celasun determined that, in 1953 and 1973, the difference in Turkey was 4 and 5 when setting productivity for agriculture at 1.

What is happening to income distribution in Turkey? When attempting to answer this question, the first thing to do is examine the differences in productivity between sectors and segments within sectors.

Celasun first determined the number of persons fully employed in each sector and in each segment in 1973, 1978, and 1983. He then set per-capita productivity (value added) in the agricultural sector at 1. Finally, he calculated the differences in productivity in the other-than-agriculture sector and in segments of that sector. (See Table No 1)

While 1983 per-capita value added in agriculture at current prices was 1, it was, for example, 7.1 in the manufacturing industry and 12.9 in commerce.

In other words, while each person working in agriculture contributed a share of 1, a person employed in industry contributed a share of 7.1 and one in commerce, a share of 12.9.

Does this mean that agricultural workers were lazy or that employees in other sectors worked harder?

When looking at previous years' statistics, interesting developments attract attention. A difference between agriculture and other sectors has always existed, and agriculture's productivity has always been lower. The situation that existed in 1983, however, was much worse for agriculture than in 1978. Whereas the difference between agriculture and sectors other than agriculture was 1 and 4.9 in 1978, it rose to 1 and 6.5 in 1983.

Development, however, means affluence and requires, not a rise in difference, but the opposite, a decrease.

The purpose of this article is to reveal that agriculture has lost ground while sectors other than agriculture in general and commerce in particular have gained ground. Why has agriculture had setbacks? Why have the other sectors gradually succeeded? These questions will be examined in tomorrow's column.

Table 1. Employment and Difference in Per-Capita Value Added (Productivity)

	Employment (in 10,000's)			Difference in Productivity				
	1973	1978	1983	1973	1978	1983	1978	1983
1. Agricultural	9,580	9,537	9,451	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
2. Non-agricultural								
a. Mining	160	217	226	5.9	7.3	4.7	6.0	10.2
b. Manufacturing	1,419	1,610	1,685	4.2	3.9	4.4	4.6	7.1
c. Construction	456	562	586	4.0	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.5
d. Commerce	544	646	696	8.0	7.7	7.9	8.1	12.9
e. Public	682	1,083	1,204	6.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.3
f. Other	1,417	1,594	1,720	4.8	5.0	4.3	5.0	6.3
	4,678*	5,712*	6,126*	5.1+	4.7+	4.6+	4.9+	6.5+
3. Totals	14,258	15,249	15,577					

[\*Total employment a-f]

[+Average difference a-f]

Source: Prof Dr Celasun

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**MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY SHOWED STRONG YEAR IN 1986**

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Dec 86 p 9

[Text] The ISO [Istanbul Chamber of Industry] announced that the rapid rate of production increase demonstrated by the manufacturing industry in the first half of 1986 continued into the second half of the year. According to a study of nearly 1,000 large industrial organizations belonging to the ISO, the manufacturing industry achieved a true production growth of 11.5 percent in the third quarter of 1986. Although the rate of increase was high, it fell short of the growth rate attained in the first and second quarters of the year. Growth in the first 9 months was 13.3 percent. The DIE [State Statistical Institute], meanwhile, reported that the growth rate for the manufacturing industry throughout Turkey was 10.9 percent.

The ISO study found that there was a large increase in the percentage of goods manufactured for sales and that firms operated with a negligible percentage of stock, 0.4 percent. The total value of goods produced by the nearly 1,000 industrial organizations belonging to the ISO was 1,435,000,000,000 liras.

Data taken from the ISO study entitled, "The General State of the Manufacturing Industry in the Third Quarter of 1986," includes:

1. The manufacturing industry's average growth rate during the first 9 months of 1986 rose to 13.1 percent, the highest increase in recent years.
2. The firms included in the study demonstrated extremely vital sales strength in the third quarter. Whereas sales from production rose to a high level, 1,429,922,000,000 liras, sales of existing stock fell to 0.4 percent, 5,129,000,000 liras.
3. The stock turnover was 4 percent in the first quarter and 214 percent in the second quarter.
4. The highest true growth rate in the third quarter occurred in the basic metals sector of the manufacturing industry, achieving an increase of 50.4 percent. Production in this branch had more than doubled in both the first and second quarters of the year. The forestry-products industry was second with a growth rate of 39.3 percent.

5. The industrial branch based on rocks and soil and the non-electrical and electrical-machine industrial sector grew at a pace of over 10 percent.

6. The ratio of usage to capacity rose in parallel with the growth seen in manufacturing in the third quarter of 1986. Unweighted capacity usage rose to 63.5 percent for the first time while weighted capacity usage remained steady at 73.4 percent.

7. Among the reasons for the inability to use full capacity was a decrease, for the first time this quarter, in demand.

8. The nearly 1,000 firms that participated in the study anticipate an increase in sales in the upcoming quarter.

**Manufacturing Industry, Third Quarter 1986**

	Growth Rate	Stock Turn-over (%)	Capacity Usage (unweighted %)
Entire manufacturing industry	11.5	0.4	63.5
Food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco	1.1	9.1	62.4
Textiles, leather goods, shoes	18.4	1.4	68.0
Forestry products	39.3	6.1	54.2
Stone and soil products	10.6	1.8	67.4
Chemicals, petroleum products, tires, plastics	0.2	0.8	60.7
Basic metals	50.4	0.6	61.9

**Production Increase, January-September 1986  
(%)**

Entire manufacturing industry	13.1
Food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco	4.4
Textiles, leather goods, shoes	23.5
Forestry products	28.9
Stone and soil products	14.6
Chemicals, petroleum products, tires, plastics	1.5
Basic metals	32.2

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**ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONING OF NAVAL ARSENAL OUTLINED**

Koblenz MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German Sep/Oct 86 pp 298-302

[Article by Manfred Gottwald: "The Naval Arsenal--An Important Support Element Of The German Navy"; first paragraph is MARINE-RUNDSCHAU introduction]

[Text] As the largest administrative unit in the armament sector, the Naval Arsenal--with approximately 4,900 employees--reports directly to the Federal Department of Military Technology and Procurement. The author, a training and continuing education official at the Wilhelmshaven Naval Arsenal, in the following describes the mission, organization, and structure of this "general establishment" of the Federal Armed Forces for maintaining the equipment of the Navy's ships, boats, and land installations.

In 1985 the Naval Arsenal contracted for more than DM843 million. It was by far the Arsenal's "most productive" fiscal year since its establishment in 1957. The long-term average is about DM670 million, but extraordinarily high annual fluctuations of  $\pm$  DM170 million occur. These plain numbers alone an indication of the imponderables and difficulties of maintaining the Navy's equipment. The Naval Arsenal must take account of these external conditions in its management centers, in its two large shipyard installations and in its numerous branch facilities, and adjust to them in its organization and mode of operation. But what is really included in the organization of the "Marine Arsenal?" The name itself is misleading in two respects: On the one hand, the Naval Arsenal is not really part of the Navy but an administrative unit of the Federal Department of Military Technology and Procurement in Koblenz and consequently, reports to the armament department of the civilian Ministry of Defense. On the other hand, the designation "arsenal" is also misleading since in common parlance the term implies a "warehouse" or "weapons depot."

The Naval Arsenal is actually a "general establishment" of the Bundeswehr for maintaining the Navy's ships, boats, and land installations.

**Primary Mission**

The primary mission of the armament sector's largest official establishment is:

**At the operation center:**

Management of maintenance projects which includes planning, control, coordination and monitoring of specific activities, and the awarding of contracts.

**At the shipyards:**

Repair within its own facilities of warship-specific as well as electric and electronic systems.

The Naval Arsenal performs these tasks in two ways and uses a different organizational structure for their operational sequences:

--Planned and unplanned materiel maintenance projects. These are depot and interim repairs and also repairs of extensive damage at sea which, because of its serious nature, requires intensive planning and control and is, therefore, assigned to the center and its management organization.

--Immediate repairs. This activity handles the numerous, less serious types of damage which occur in the course of unit operations. This function must be performed quickly and close to the unit's area of operation with as little administrative effort as possible.

**The Wilhelmshaven Center**

This center is the pivotal control point for handling planned and unplanned materiel maintenance. The medium-term materiel maintenance plan is formulated and reassessed here for a five-year planning period in close cooperation with the Naval Support Command and the Fleet Command. The purpose of the plan is, on the one hand, to assign an even work load to the Arsenal's facilities in line with their capabilities and to gain a timely appreciation of the contracts to be awarded to private industry. On the other hand, optimum materiel readiness of the Navy should be assured. Because of the limiting conditions contractual peaks and valleys are hardly avoidable even in the planning state.

**Planning and Overhaul Operations**

If one were to use the approximately DM50 million depot maintenance cost for a destroyer as a gauge for the effort it represents, one could readily visualize the problems that would be created for the Naval Arsenal if only "two more warships than usual" had to undergo such a major over-haul in one year. The medium-term materiel maintenance plan is already concretized in an annual plan with fixed schedules for each coming year to make timely preparations for plannable future requirements.

One can not, of course, plan for unforeseen accidents aboard or at sea although their cost may rapidly reach millions. These unplanned tasks must be handled in the course of, or in addition to, planned materiel maintenance.

The execution of specific tasks relating to a ship or boat is the responsibility of the project officer for the repair work required for a specific project. The project officer, in close collaboration with representatives of the Naval Support Command and the unit command aboard, determines already on board ship the status of its equipment and systems, often in advance of actual repair lay days; he also describes the work required to accomplish the task and solicits bids from civilian contractors or initiates the publication of a request for proposals for the work to be performed. The project officer evaluates proposals after their costs have been checked by the Arsenal's operation center, and he sees to it that contracts are awarded to private industry and assigns tasks to the Arsenal's workshops.

The project can now be initiated with the first period of lay days at the naval shipyard. During this period, in which the ship or boat is docked at one of the ports of the Naval Arsenal, assessments are made and systems and equipment which can be repaired by the Arsenal's own workshops are dismounted if necessary. After this phase there is a period of lay days at a quay of one of the civilian shipyards which handle construction and technical overhauls. Execution of the work at commercial shipyards is supervised directly at the site by branch office employees of the operation center.

After lay days at the commercial shipyard, the ship or boat returns to the Naval Arsenal for its second period of lay days at which time the repaired systems and equipment are reinstalled, integrated into the overall system and properly adjusted.

The project officer and his assistants accept the work done by naval workshops and commercial contractors and certify the unit's functional and operational reliability to the Navy.

The process of changing military equipment is controlled by the project officer in the same manner. He issues performance specifications and monitors the performance of the contract up to and including the updating of documentation.

An example of the Naval Arsenal's responsibility was its management of the actual retrofitting of the Z-103 B destroyer.

#### Employee Training

The operation center's responsibility also includes timely planning for the future overhaul of new weapon systems or of new installations and equipment which also includes drafting of contributions to the logistical plans (Log V) in which technical maintenance concepts for future systems are established. An assessment is made of the operational resources required for the Arsenal's workshops and the corresponding training of employees is initiated. The volatile development of electronics during the past decade, and especially the use of computers aboard units afloat, called for new approaches to repairs. For that reason the Arsenal has

for several years used easily programmable checkout systems for finding errors on electronic plug-in cards which the Arsenal's engineers can use interchangeably for different weapon systems. Aside from a thorough knowledge of hardware, necessary in any case, knowledge of software has also become increasingly indispensable in the application of new technologies. The Naval Arsenal has adjusted to this development and trains its employees to be prepared for such tasks.

Much of the software and electronic training is handled by teachers who are also Naval Arsenal employees. This cost-saving procedure of updating scientific knowledge by "in-house training" has been successful and it, moreover, necessary because of current difficulties in hiring replacements. Since 1979, 300 members of the Naval Arsenal have successfully completed the Heinz Piest Electronic Courses and have thereby met the requirements for acceptance in special equipment-oriented training courses offered by manufacturers. Software and programming courses are also part of the teaching repertoire of agency employees.

In addition to tasks relating to planned and unplanned materiel maintenance, the Kiel and Wilhelmshaven shipyard operations are above all responsible for immediate repairs. Quick service to the Navy is stressed. For this reason the shipyards operate branch workshops at the larger naval support bases to be close to those who need their services. The Navy does not even have to forego all Naval Arsenal support on the high seas because of the availability of two workshop ships, the Wotan and the Odin, which track their "clients" into maneuver areas.

#### EDP Procedures

Roughly 40,000 individual contracts are awarded annually to industrial sites by management coordinators. The coordinators and those who plan for the utilization of available capacity in preparing for work at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven have primary responsibility for optimal use of the workshops' personnel and equipment for project-related tasks. They balance the long-term overhaul requirements planned by the operation center against short-term immediate repair tasks. This responsibility also includes providing for needed work resources and timely availability of required materials.

These duties almost demands the use of electronic data processing. The Naval Arsenal has, therefore, developed an Arsenal software program (PARS) which makes it possible to monitor specific jobs and their progress in the workshops and by means of which, if priority requirements demand, the performance schedule of specific tasks can be advanced or delayed. The total number of jobs at hand and the work load of the workshops can be retrieved and displayed within seconds and this even includes future jobs to the extent that they are predictable. The introduction of PARS has had the effect of reducing the number of contracts awarded to commercial firms, of increasing the efficiency of Naval Arsenal operations and, consequently, of lowering Navy expenses.

Economy is a catchword which often leads to ridicule when mentioned in conjunction with the expenditure of public funds. Naval Arsenal operations, which are in real competition with comparable commercial enterprises, must not only make every effort to rationalize their operations but must also continuously monitor cost-effectiveness. The figures calculated by the operational accounting department enable management to control and analyze precisely the economic efficiency of individual operational sections. Arsenal operations--as shown by internal operational cost accounting--need not fear comparison to commercial enterprises. Efficiency computations for hourly rates of Arsenal operations show them to be lower than comparable figures for private enterprise. In some areas the naval shipyards are even considerably more cost-effective than commercial firms, for the comparison "jibes" even when "production structure" criteria are applied.

An obvious prerequisite for accomplishing repair jobs quickly is the availability of needed spare parts. Arsenal facilities must, consequently, stock about 100,000 different spare parts and expendable items at all times.

#### Workshop Areas--Nucleus Of The Two Shipyards

The workshop sections with their engineers, technicians, foremen and skilled workers are the Arsenal's production centers. Corresponding to the different technical areas aboard the ships and boats, these sections are organized into the following departments:

- Ship construction: with shipyards, locksmithing, welding, carpentry, wainscoting and paint shops;
- Mechanical: motor engineering, auxiliary machines, winches and mine sweeping equipment, cranes, compressed air installations and mechanical workshops;
- Electrotechnology: general electric systems, electric machines, precision and optical instruments, periscope systems, minesweeping cable and control systems, gyroscope systems, accumulators, and galvanizing;
- Communication technology: radio transmitters, transceivers and receivers; navigational transmissions, C3, reporting and monitoring systems; and PC modules;
- Position-finding technology: tactical and navigational radar systems, IFF (friend-foe identification), EW systems, active and passive sonar systems and depthfinders;
- Fire control technology: analog and digital fire control systems, universal digital commutators, local and central stabilizers, gyroscope platform and sights;

—Weapons: artillery weapons, missile release systems, torpedo tubes, optical director and hydraulic components, ammunition hoisting and conveyor equipment.

The work equipment of Arsenal workshops reflects the development of the Federal Navy during the past 30 years. "Old-timers," dating back to the time when equipment was first issued to the Bundeswehr, stand side by side with modern microelectronic instruments. This is a typical problem for maintenance operations which is particularly pronounced because of the long periods for which military installations and equipment are in use. However, it is not only the generational difference of the installations' technology which complicates workshop performance but also the multitude of equipment made by different manufacturers of many countries.

The unit quantity of individual pieces of equipment is small and corresponds to "departments" for ship and boat classes. "Conveyor belt" operations are nearly impossible under such conditions. Craftsmen, foremen, technicians and engineers, who—though specialists—are adaptable and know how to improvise, are much in demand. A ship is like a floating small town with all resources needed for daily life onboard and for combat operations. Consequently, the Naval Arsenal—which for immediate repairs is supposed to correct damage as much as possible with its own resources—is also involved with many different areas of craftsmanship. Almost all manual trades can, therefore, be found in the workshops, even such "exotic" trades as wainscoting, sail making, upholstering, decorating, leather craft, optometry, chronometry, galvanizing and vulcanizing.

The workshops are responsible for their own quality control and check the quality of overhaul jobs themselves. This means that final checks of equipment and systems are made by their own personnel. This procedure, which deviates from that of private industry, has been proven effective since the functional performance of the equipment must be systemically tested after it has been reinstalled in the unit. Total system integration is the responsibility of test teams. They connect the position-locating devices (radar, sonar, optics) with the fire control computer of the individual weapons (artillery, missiles, torpedoes) and test the static and dynamic performance of the weapon system. The Naval Arsenal has its own calibration laboratory for repair and control of the quite numerous measurement and test instruments in its facilities.

#### Apprentice Training Support

Workshops are served by general support operations. Their equipment, aside from specialized vehicles, includes such items as floating docks, lift pontoons, work boats, tugboats, as well as two 100 t floating cranes and ships for cleaning oil tanks. The shipyard at Kiel also has a pressure dock in which submarines can be subjected to external water pressure for testing purposes.

The training workshops in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven employ a total of 200 trainees annually. During the growth years of the facilities, training of their own personnel was a dire necessity. Today, professional training

at the Naval Arsenal is more like a social support program for the economically depressed coastal regions. Teaching positions are in short supply as indicated by the more than 2,000 applications received each year. For that reason Naval Arsenal installations have greatly increased their training capacity in recent years. Course materials and final examinations are controlled by the Board of Trade as is the case for vocational training institutions of private industry. Quality of training is generally recognized to be excellent, a fact from which the Bundeswehr profits indirectly since about two-thirds of the trainees begin their military service after completion of training and many of them serve for extended periods.

In its present form the Naval Arsenal has proven itself as a general establishment for the Navy's materiel maintenance. The complexity and extent of its mission places high demands on its employees. The steady and increasingly rapid development of weapon-system technology calls for flexibility and adaptability, and the size of the federal budget demands, now more than ever, that a "state enterprise" must operate in a circumspect and economical manner. Last but not least, the North German coastal "shipyard crises" also mandates application of political acumen. In view of all this, the Navy has learned to appreciate its civilian partner in the logistic system. Trusting cooperation has become routine.

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**VERTICAL ANTITANK WEAPON SYSTEM FOR ALPHA-JET IN TEST PHASE**

Stuttgart FLUG REVUE in German Dec 86 p 54

[Article by Hanfried Schliephake: "Stay under Cover"]

[Text] The concept of a generally automated engagement of armored targets during direct target overflight, without leaving the cover of low-level flight, is not new. It was implemented even toward the end of World War II, but only in the testing stage. Its modern successor is the vertical on-board weapon (VBW) for antitank defense, which is to be employed by the West German Air Force.

Due to a tactical requirement of the military, the vertical on-board weapon (previous designation: Vebal Syndrom) developed by MBB on its own initiative at the beginning of the 1980's, now exists as a unit-pod design, in contrast to the experimental dual-pod version. The weapon is to be used primarily as a combat enhancement tool for the Alpha Jet weapon system employed as light fighter-bomber and in the close air support role. It shall also cover the tactical gap until capable stand-off systems become available.

As expected, the weapon will be employed to engage armored vehicles, but in contrast to existing, conventional armor-piercing aircraft weapons, the low-flying, high speed flight profile will be protected, so that the enemy targets cannot use either cover angle nor shadows to their advantage.

The vertical on-board weapon of the Alpha jet version consists of a projectile carrier with 18 downward-pointed tubes to hold the AT ammunition (presently the French type STRIM-89), the multisensor packet with IR target scanner (IRLS), the laser altitude finder (LHM) and a radiometer and on-board computer, detonator and test devices.

In low-level flight, the sensors scan an approximately 30 meter wide terrain strip in front of and to both sides of the flight path, and can uniquely identify armored targets (by geometry, heat emission and metal). Upon positive identification, the weapons computer automatically fires the armor-piercing ammunition of the best-placed tube. The projectile then hits the target on its weakly armored top side after a brief vertical flight, while the carrier aircraft remains in the protection of low-level, high-speed flight, without being exposed to enemy air defense as in the pop-up method of target recognition and

engagement. In contrast to conventional dispenser weapons, each target is engaged by directly aimed fire.

The final weight of the VBW pod is about that of a BL-755 cluster bomb, or around 280 kg. The vertical on-board weapon requires a power supply interface to the carrier, and can thus be employed by nearly all NATO combat aircraft.

Flight testing with the Alpha Jet weapon system as carrier, was begun with four prototype pods. Initial flight firing tests were scheduled for this autumn, so that systems could be delivered to troop units before the end of the decade.

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**PLANS FOR MULTINATIONAL 155MM SP HOWITZER ABANDONED**

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 15 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Th.: "European Armaments Project Fails"]

[Text] Great Britain, Italy and the FRG have abandoned the project for a 155mm SP howitzer based on the existing, joint-developed "Field Howitzer 70." Work had been continuing on the development since 1973. Deputy British Defense Minister Hamilton reported the decision to the lower house and stated that the individual countries are continuing the research domestically. Great Britain is said to have already invested 88 million pounds sterling (about RM260 million) in the preparatory development work. The background of the decision is the desire of Britain, which must urgently replace its old SP howitzers, to emphasize a "domestic solution" now.

An army spokesman in the Bonn Defense Ministry confirmed that the joint venture "SP Howitzer 70"--for which about DM800 million has already been spent on development efforts, has finally been abandoned. The German portion of incurred development costs is DM300 million, according to information from Bonn. Originally, the West German army alone, intended to obtain 400 of the "SP 700 Howitzers," which were developed by Rheinmetall, Vickers and Oto-Melara.

The reasons for the termination of the joint armament project, according to technical experts, were technical difficulties and the differing tactical requirements of the particular armed forces. For example, the Italian army required the ability for extremely steep-angle fire, in order to be able to fight in the Alpine valleys. This is said to have complicated the requirements considerably. The automatic loader developed in Italy is said not to have met the requirements. The prototypes also proved to be unreliable in other areas. Overall, the performance for the West German army was not in an appropriate relationship to the constantly rising costs. More recent developments also made an "autonomous gun" possible, and the "SP Howitzer 70" could not have been refined for this purpose. Therefore, the West German parliament had already terminated its development at the end of 1985.

As is also heard in Bonn, the European armaments project begun in 1973 was converted into a domestic "SP Howitzer 2000" project, to develop an SP howitzer for the year 2000 which should be able to meet the growing threat from Soviet armaments projects. The information gained represented a "valuable basis" for further development. In order to meet the "interim needs" of army units, the West German army is examining the possibility of procuring for DM270 million, another approximately 80 combat-enhanced artillery weapons in the United States, like the 586 existing M 109-G SP howitzers which were fitted with the "Field Howitzer 70" gun tube.

**NAVY'S MINE WARFARE FLOTILLA COMMANDER HINTS AT INADEQUACIES**

Koblenz MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German Sep/Oct 86 pp 273-276

[Article by Capt Robert Hendrick van Spall: "Netherlands' Mine Countermeasures--80 Years of Royal Dutch Navy Mine Warfare Forces"; first paragraph is MARINE-RUNDSCHAU introduction]

[Excerpts] The commander of the Mine Countermeasures Service, a captain in the Royal Dutch Navy, discusses in this commemorative article the historical development, the current status, and the training of his unit. He predicts that for NATO naval forces mine countermeasures of the future will become primarily a joint responsibility.

**Geographic Considerations**

In case of war, most of the aid for West Europe will have to cross the North Atlantic and the North Sea. Logistic support for Europe must arrive in time and in adequate quantities. The southern North Sea ports represent vital receiving points for these supplies--in the first place, because their location is in close proximity to the central front and, in the second place, because the loss of one port, though serious, would not by itself be catastrophic if several other large ports and an excellent rail and road infrastructure remained available. Ships, in addition to transporting military supplies and personnel, satisfy West Europe's essential economic needs even in peacetime. Consequently, very heavy maritime traffic develops already in the southern sector of the North Sea when there is a crisis. Because of its shallow waters, this area is also well suited for exploiting natural resources. An interruption of shipping traffic could therefore have catastrophic repercussions.

The Netherlands adjoin the southern periphery of the North Sea and have a coastline of about 200 nautical miles with many major ports. Adequate and efficient mine countermeasures are, therefore, indispensable for the Royal Dutch Navy. The Navy's mine countermeasure forces are consolidated in the Dutch Mine Countermeasure Service....

**The Current Status Of The Dutch Mine Countermeasure Service**

Placing the HNLMS Alkmaar minehunter in service on 28 May 1983 represented an important step in the modernization of the Dutch Mine Countermeasure

Service. Minehunters of the Alkmaar type belong to the "Tripartite" class, an excellent example of international cooperation. The protocol for the Tripartite project was signed in 1975 by the French, Belgian and Dutch Navy. It provided for an even distribution of research, construction and assembly tasks and for the construction of 40 identical ships, 15 of which were intended for the Dutch Navy. The program represents the combined know-how and experience of the three countries. Only the large number of ships involved enabled the three navies to develop, test and modernize special components and naval construction technologies under one program which would have far exceeded the financial and technical capabilities as well as the means of a single country. Tripartite-class minehunters are made of fiberglass-reinforced plastic and have an average displacement of 510 tons. They are equipped with a primary drive system (diesel) and a drive (gas turbine/electric) for minehunting operations and also with an automatic steering system in conjunction with a bow thruster unit. The most recent state of the art is utilized to counter the threat of mines. Computer-assisted systems expedite maneuvering and data processing near ground and moored mines, while wire-guided submersibles, equipped with TV and explosive charges, can safely destroy the acquired mines. The ship is primarily designed for the North Sea and can handle mines up to a depth of at least 80 m. Nine Alkmaar-class minehunters are currently in service while the remaining six are still in various stages of construction.

For its minesweeping operations the Dutch Navy must rely on 11, about 30-year-old Dokkum-class minesweepers which are still in very good condition despite their age. These ships are still able to carry out their function since new minesweeping technologies are not yet available. However, this will change rapidly. Since it has now been recognized that a minesweeping capability is also needed to meet the threat of mines, new minesweeping technologies will soon become operational. This means that, in view of the obsolescence of Dokkum-class minesweepers, a new class of coastal minesweepers will be placed in service at the beginning of the 90's. Minehunters and minesweepers, excepting the smaller boats, are organized into two flotillas, one of which is based at Den Helder and the other at Flushing. Both ports have adequate logistic facilities. The Dutch Navy, moreover, also participates in the Standing Naval Force Channel, a permanent NATO squadron composed of mine countermeasures ships of North Sea countries.

Another part of the Mine Countermeasures Service is the diving and explosive ordnance disposal unit which operates out of Den Helder and Flushing. This unit consists of 30 highly qualified and well-trained mine clearance divers. Their diving mission includes ship repair as well as mine clearance operations. They have scuba air and gas mixture diving equipment as well as surface-air supply systems. This unit disposes of an average of 500 explosive charges a year which include limpet and other mines, torpedoes and aircraft bombs. The unit also cooperates with the medical divers unit in recompression chamber treatment after diving accidents. The recompression chamber itself is located at the technical diving center of the Den Helder Mine Countermeasures Service base.

## **Training**

Aside from its training during mine clearance diving operations, the diving staff is also trained at the Mine Countermeasures School at Ostend [Belgium]. In 1965 the two countries merged their mine countermeasures schools at the Ostend installation. This school has binational status and serves both the Belgian and the Dutch Navy. Other NATO countries are always welcome.

The school offers training for both active and reserve officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, thus enabling them to carry out mine countermeasures. The school is always under the command of its most senior officer and the two navies alternate in filling this position. The school's training staff is composed of mine countermeasures specialists from both navies.

Cooperation with the Belgian Navy, however, extends far beyond institutionalized training. In a crisis the two navies have a joint command structure and with the introduction of the Tripartite-class minehunters a major part of the mine countermeasures force will be standardized. Since the mine countermeasures forces of both navies operate in the same mine defense environment of the southern North Sea, the advantages of this cooperation are obvious. Although the school is not part of the Mine Countermeasures Service organization, the commander of the Mine Countermeasures Service is a member of its "Board of Directors" and the link between the school and the defense ministries of the two countries.

Training of mine clearance divers takes place at the HNLMS Thetis diving and explosive charges school which is housed in a hotel at Den Oever, a small village near Den Helder, which offers ideal conditions for all types of diving. The school also trains ship divers for the fleet and combat divers for the Dutch Marine Corps.

## **Future Improvements**

The introduction of microelectronics has made mines increasingly precise and increasingly able to distinguish between mine-clearing equipment and an actual target. The kill range of an activated mine can be increased and mine manufacturers have a multitude of modern technologies at their disposal. Most important is the fact that a minelayer is no longer restricted to operating in shallow waters since the new developments in mine construction make minelaying also feasible at greater depths. Future defense against mines must consider the fact that mine countermeasures resources will also have to be employed in the waters above and even beyond the continental shelf. Mine countermeasures will consequently change from being a national to being a NATO responsibility. The southern North Sea will remain the primary operational area of the Dutch Mine Countermeasures Service. However, the threat of mines in deeper waters also requires NATO to have adequate forces at its disposal to counter this additional future threat.

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**ELITE FORMATION TO GUARD AGAINST SABOTAGE OF AIR BASES**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Jan 87 Sec 2 pp 1-3

[Article by Claes Britton: "New Elite Commandos Hunt Saboteurs"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction!]

[Text] A new type of commando unit will stop enemy saboteurs. Claes Britton and photographer Rolf Soderberg accompanied the Air Base Commandos during their test exercises.

Twenty-four hours before the start of the Air Base Commandos test exercises the snow began to fall. It was the first really heavy snowfall of the year in south and central Sweden. When the Air Base Commandos arrived at Satenas late Sunday evening after the weekend, the ground was thickly covered with snow. The heavy snowfall continued with undiminished intensity.

"We will never be able to bicycle with all this snow. They will have to find some other way."

"Oh hell yes, we will bicycle. They will just say that it will take two days instead of one if necessary."

The Air Base Commandos are one of Sweden's newest military units. The requirements are very high. Of the 100 young men who began training, there now remain only 47.

"I am simply getting poor material from the Recruiting Bureau. I cannot adapt the training just to the abilities of these kids," said Captain Lennart Thomsen, head of the Commando School.

The Air Base Commandos will stop enemy saboteurs from knocking out aircraft and pilots on the ground during the first phase of a war.

Now comes the test exercise: twenty-four hours of difficult tests which are arranged as a competition. The four groups of the platoon measure their physical and psychical strengths against each other.

The Air Base Commandos prepare their equipment for the next day's exercises. The 18-kilogram knapsacks are packed to be most easily carried. Boots are

carefully polished, and countless leather straps of the many articles of equipment are fastened neatly. Some men have been down in the cellar, and are returning with their long and greasy AK-4's. Caps, mittens, weapons, cooking utensils and thermos bottles are spread out over the gray linoleum floor. In the air is the special bitter-sweet smell which is characteristic of military places, and which probably comes from the weapon grease.

The time is just after one in the morning. In a few hours reveille will sound for a day's travel over snowy roads. Seven miles cycling and three miles on foot. [In this article "mile" means Swedish mile, or 10 km] Several soldiers are lying in their beds trying to sleep, but it is difficult. Many of the men are in high spirits and have stories to tell about the weekend. They slap on the locker doors and talk in loud voices in a rude manner.

"Have you heard Karlsson's latest? He met a 30-year-old who was completely wild. He's a devil, that one!"

Racy drinking and women stories were mixed with assurances of how miserable it is going to be on tomorrow's march, and how much more miserable it was when we were on such and such an exercise at such and such a place.

The next morning the tension was much more low-keyed, at least in the beginning. A delayed Lucia celebration took place, with the obligatory fleshy opinions about the tender damsels. Then the platoon mounted in groups into the narrow terrain vehicles and was driven in to the Lidkoping bathhouse where the first event of the test exercise competition, swimming, took place.

The swimming event was first a relay race with 50-meter stretches, and then a test of energy; the commandos were to demonstrate courage by climbing up a soapy rope to a 5-meter trampoline and jumping down again.

Fifty meters proved to be a strenuous distance for inexpert swimmers. Shouting with enthusiasm they threw themselves into the water and began stroking at a frantic tempo. But at the turn, after 25 meters, the muscles of most of them had gone weak and the second length went sluggishly. During the last few meters many had trouble keeping themselves afloat.

The rope climb went better. The commando platoon demonstrated good energy. Only a few individual soldiers failed to get up the rope, and instead had to swim an extra distance, losing time as a penalty.

The 4th Group started last in the swimming, and had the best average time. The atmosphere in the dressing room afterwards was upbeat. The eleven soldiers got dressed quickly in order to get up on the bicycles, which were waiting outside, as quickly as possible. The conscripts' group chief, Emretsson, a powerfully built blond boy, was eternally optimistic, and inspired his crew:

"We showed that we are the best if we really want to be. We will do our best, and get better, wont we boys?"

Most agreed with him. Although the swimming is of little importance in the outcome of the 24-hour competition they have smelled success.

But a couple of the boys were less enthusiastic. They complained that the slippery rope had chafed their skin. Awiti, the dog master, said that he was getting sick at his stomach, and the swimming did not help it.

#### High Departure Rate

The Air Base Commandos are not chosen from among volunteer applicants, as are the famous Coastal Commandos and the Paratroopers. The unit was created in 1983, and it still has not become sufficiently well-known or famous to attract the physically elite volunteers.

Instead the Recruit Bureau selects recruits from the ranks and makes them Air Base Commandos--often without the conscript's knowledge of what kind of unit he is coming into.

For this reason the departure rate is very high--the unprepared recruits often lack the psychic motivation and the physical capability to carry out the demanding commando training, with about 100 field days in 7 and one-half months. The commander of the Air Base Commando School, Captain Lennart Thomsen, puts a large part of the blame for the poor organization and the waste of resources on the Recruit Bureau.

"The world championship cannot be won with a division five team," said Captain Thomsen. "It is obvious when they send boys here who are at the bottom of the scale in their physical tests."

When Captain Thomsen makes a comparison with the world championships he is referring to the task that the Air Base Commandos would have in war. Then, aided by dogs, they would have to hunt and then make harmless (kill or disable) the Russian saboteurs--spetsnaz--who are trying to penetrate Swedish air bases to sabotage runways, shoot up aircraft and liquidate "key personnel."

One can hardly think of a more difficult combat mission, according to Captain Thomsen. The spetsnaz troops are said to be recruited from the cream of Soviet soldiers, and trained for years. They are masters of the entire range of effective killing and cruelty.

"Those whom we must meet are the elite of the elite. Therefore we must also be out in front."

He hopes for better "soldier material" as early as next year. He has gone around to all the offices of the Recruit Bureau to inform them what the Air Base Commandos really are. They will also print a brochure with bright four-color pages which they hope will cause physically well-equipped recruits to be interested in the Air Base Commandos.

But the most important element in the effort to make the unit more attractive is without a doubt the beret. The beret is the mark of the elite military unit, a symbol of manhood appealing to boys reaching the end of their teens. The green berets of the Coastal Commandos and the wine-red berets of the Paratroopers are already classics. And now after the first of the year, just like the main guard at the palace, the Air Base Commandos will have their green berets with the emblem--a lynx head. Captain Thomsen smiled contentedly when he said, "It will surely be popular. Many boys are ready to cut off vital parts of their bodies to get their berets. And when we go on main guard duty it will have to be at least -40 degrees before we can't wear our new berets."

#### Unbelievably Toilsome

The beret is the only equipment detail which apparently distinguishes a commando unit from ordinary infantry soldiers. When the 4th Group came up after swimming to their TGAC's [Terrain-Going Attack Cycles] (that is really the name for the ungainly iron bicycles) they could actually have been mistaken for bicycle-mounted infantry from the 40's. Green-clad and heavily loaded they struggle forth on the snow-covered roads. It is unbelievably toilsome to walk, and one must pay close attention in order not to slip and fall.

The first field competition station along the cycle way is a so-called orientation point after four kilometers. The group has to divide up and search for a number of orientation control points before continuing to cycle. Previously the 4th Group's chief Emretsson has read a map incorrectly and the group rode an unnecessarily long way. At the orientation point it went even worse. Emretsson read the map incorrectly again, and a part of the group got lost in an inaccessible forest.

Some of the group began to fall behind on their bicycles. Emretsson stepped up the tempo at the head, and a gap opened to the four soldiers in the rear. The dog master Awiti still complained about his stomach ache, and two of the others also had stomach problems. A fourth began to have a troublesome semi-lunar cartilage.

It was a worn-out cycle group for the last three miles back to the barracks where the meal was waiting. The temperature sank a bit, and the snow on the road was covered by a thin sheet of ice which made it even harder to bicycle. On the smaller, unplowed roads there was only a small rut to keep into. The entire time the bicycles were sliding and nearly falling. Darkness fell, but nobody wanted to use their lights, because the generator made it more difficult to pedal. Across the open stretches the damp, cold wind gained speed and cut through clothes to the sweaty bodies.

Now and then Emretsson tried to get a commando song started--"it makes it so much easier to ride." There are some really beastly rhythmic songs for singing while marching. Such as, "I killed a Russian soldier--hung him in a tree--gray stuff from his brains--ran down over his medals" and such as that.

But the songs would not really get started. Here one can see that the Air Base Commandos were conscripts, not volunteers.

#### Tracking With Dogs

The combat methods of the Air Base Commandos are relatively new and still not yet entirely worked out. Saboteurs have been used in war for a long time, but it is only recently, since U-137, Harsfjarden and the mystical Suvarov's book "Inside the Red Army" that the Swedish armed forces have seriously begun to work out a strategy for meeting the threat from probable Soviet "spetsnaz" groups.

The wartime mission of the Air Base Commandos is to protect all of our country's air bases, primarily during the so-called twilight situation--the uncertain condition just before war breaks out, and when the saboteurs are expected to strike in order to make a mobilization more difficult.

The hunting method of the Air Base Commandos is based on tracking with dogs. Each group has two specially trained dogs, mostly German Shepherds, each one with its own master.

Each commando platoon has very large areas to patrol, but they expect to be able to concentrate on smaller areas where the saboteurs are expected to hide.

"Searching with dogs the way we do is very much more reliable and effective than more modern techniques such as, for example, heat detection," said Captain Thomsen.

It is said that Russian spetsnaz troops are equipped with anti-dog gas, along with a lot of other things, but Captain Thomsen does not believe it. In any case he has not seen any such gas yet.

"The way we use our dogs is probably unique," he maintained further.

#### Hateful Comments

When the 4th Group finally arrived at the barracks at Satenas it was late in the afternoon. The first stage of the cycling had taken much longer than expected because of the road conditions. Toward the end the mood had become much worse and the soldiers' ailments more frequent.

Just as the group rode into the barracks area a machine pistol hit Karlsson on the knee. He moaned and tried to continue, but soon explained that it was impossible. He left the competition, "although he preferred to continue."

Before the meal the groups ran a relay race carrying a stretcher with a heavy weight on it. They shot targets with AK-4's at a couple of stations along the way.

The meal was served on a muddy and slushy forest road. Cold cuts, fried potatoes and bananas were offered in cantines and boxes. The 4th Group ate standing together with the 3rd Group, which had not yet started. There was a

conflict between the soldiers who wanted to gulp down their food to avoid wasting time, and those who wanted to eat calmly and quietly and take a chance on a moment's rest.

A soldier in the 3rd Group is the subject of almost hateful comments as he is urging his comrades to hurry up.

"That fool is not smart. Does he think that we will gain time by rushing off like madmen?"

After eating the 4th Group hurried to their barracks to change soaked uniform items. That took a little time, but group chief Emretsson, whose M-59 pants were wet to his thighs considers it necessary if his group is going to manage three more miles cycling and three miles walking.

When it was again time to get on the bicycles they became aware that the saddles chafed more than they thought at first. The first kilometers it was difficult to sit with full body weight on the infernal leather construction. Later their seat structures regained their strength through wear.

The remaining cycling went over wider, better plowed roads, which felt like a relief. The cycles almost coasted several meters by themselves with every pedal stroke. The snow had also stopped, but the temperature appeared to have dropped farther. The wind was like needles in the left side of the face on the way across open stretches. It felt good every time they passed a barn, with its warm, friendly smell of fertilizer.

The renewed energy from dinner was soon burned up, and also the temporarily improved humor. The three miles in the darkness became a drawn-out torment; the mechanical movement was wearing out the knee joints and the mental stability.

There was no longer any conversation between the cycling soldiers. All that was heard from the soldiers were constant complaints about different things. The group's defects were a veritable map of our most common everyday ills. Nobody had a hard time hanging on because he was tired. Everybody was beset by different annoying ailments.

About nine o'clock the group was alerted by a new sight, when they reached the goal for the cycling, the remarkable Hunneberg Ridge, which appeared miles long in the middle of the plain.

"Now we are finished with this crap anyway. It is a hell of a lot better to walk than to ride bicycles."

But the cycling is not finished yet. First we had to lead the attack bicycles up a two- km. long steep and icy hill. At the top of the ridge there was a new orientation task. Together the group was to mark on the map the location of a number of points on the agricultural plains below. The view from the top was magnificent, but the group was in no mood for a nature study. Most lay down on the spot to rest, while three knowledgeable map readers marked the map.

After that there were three kilometers of cycling remaining along the crest of the Ridge on a snow-covered forest road. These three kilometers felt like 10. The group took several long rests, and the dog handler Awiti, who had been in bad shape for a long time, had a hard time continuing.

After the three long kilometers there was a campfire, hot fruit soup and the sleeping bags which had been brought there. The exhausted group unpacked their gear, put on their thick windbreakers and lay down on their mattress pads. Some fell asleep immediately by the fire without bothering about the fruit soup.

The rest period was fully one-half hour long. As the camp broke up there were several who delayed. The others stood ready and waited with their sleeping bags made up, showing increasing irritation. Awiti could continue no farther. He remained sitting by the fire, waiting for a car to transport him to the barracks.

#### The Group Driven Into the Ground

The march began with a long climb down the ridge. It was stony and difficult on the steep slope. The path ran under tunnels of branches heavy with snow. The forest was pictureasque and pretty, but now all of nature is the enemy and nothing else. The least mistake on the slope meant a dangerous fall with the heavy knapsack, the AK-4 and equipment on top of one. Branches whipped the faces, and the wet snow fell between the collar and the sweaty skin. Angry grunts were the only sounds to break the silence during the long climb down.

Exercises such as this put mental stability to a tough test. It was eleven o'clock at night, and the bodies had been under a load since nine in the morning. Hunger is added to the exhaustion--only one meal during the entire time--plus cold and sweating and pain in various parts of the body.

It was physical hardship of a kind that one never encounters in civilian life.

The climb appeared to have drawn the last ounce of energy from some members of the group. Driver Bostrom quit the competition despite the attempt at persuasion by Emretsson (there is a time penalty every time someone quits). Several others stopped a short distance apart to rest a moment, standing in the road. Only Emretsson himself stepped out with undiminished energy. He was still trying to keep up the pace, to the bitterness of his exhausted comrades.

"Calm down, damn it," said a tired soldier, "Don't you understand that we have three miles farther to go?"

"Oh, stop complaining and walk, it will make you feel better."

"If you could read a map maybe we would now be a lot farther along," said the tired and angry one.

Emertsson turned sour and replied ironically:

"It is fortunate that you have a gleam in your eye."

One of the commandos' slogans is: "Situation approved, gleam in the eye!" The question is, however, whether it was psychologically appropriate for sarcasm at this time. The group was driven into the ground, and had to rest only a couple of kilometers after the climb.

When they started up again the march went at a snail's pace. Emretsson went alone 20 meters ahead of the others and signaled morosely on the radio, "Johan Adam to Bertil Johan, come in." He was probably the only one still thinking about the outcome of the competition.

Onward through the wee small hours went the march through the forest. Plodding along a narrow forest road with black curtains on both sides. Even the sound of complaints grew still, and the group moved forward with constant short rests.

The next field competition control station came in seven or eight kilometers. Still one bit to go. This time it was questions to be answered. Pictures of tanks, aircraft and antiaircraft weapons to be identified by nationality.

Second Lieutenant Jarkeborn, the officer in charge of the station, is the "intelligence expert" of the commando platoon. He had been sitting in his heated automobile and telling about the refinements of the weapons in the pictures. "This is a devil of a piece." Second Lieutenant Jarkeborn is the one who trains the commandos on the spetsnaz. He keeps himself well informed on the subject by reading the Defense Weekly and other Western defense newspapers.

A couple of soldiers were totally unconcerned with the questions. Instead they lay down and slept by the wheels of the second lieutenant's car. When the others were ready to get started, those who had been sleeping were frozen through. The night cold had penetrated the marrow of their bones, and it did not help that they were wearing wool sweaters, windbreakers and fur hats. Second Lieutenant Jarkeborn lectured about the predictable problems with sleeping during rest periods in the wintertime. When it is cold each man should be sure to get a little hot food and drink during rest periods, he said.

When the group departed from the station, weaponsman Smedberg remained behind. "It's my knee. I must go to the hospital for an X-ray in the morning." Smedberg is the fourth of the eleven members of the group to quit the field competition.

Several kilometers after the station the 4th Group passed the 2nd Group. They were sitting on the edge of the woods cooking soup on a storm kitchen. They had sat like this for one and one-half hours without being able to get going.

Several of the 4th Group wanted to follow the example of the 2nd Group. But Emretsson was relentless. The group would not take a long rest before the next station.

The next station was only three or four kilometers farther down the road. That stretch took nearly one and one-half hours to cover. When the group arrived the 1st and 3rd Groups were also there. Several of the officers were also there.

After assignment of the mission, which was the simulated blowing up of a bridge, they were surprisingly ordered to mount a terrain vehicle. The exhausted soldiers threw themselves thankfully up into the vehicle, and the majority slept immediately. The others speculated about what would happen now. Why sit in the truck when there were almost two more miles to walk?

Suddenly the engine started and the truck lurched on its way. It did not stop until it was in front of the barracks door. It was six o'clock in the morning, and it appeared that the field competition had been halted.

But after 20 cold minutes in the truck the engine started again and the group was driven out to a firing range. The frozen and sleep-drugged commandos were to have a shooting competition--running to the line in the raw morning air and firing at a disappearing target. Everyone suspected that this was the final event in the competition, and immediately they regained strength. On the way home from the firing range Emretsson could surely have coaxed forth a commando song from the group.

It was very correct to halt the field exercise. The weather had thrown the time schedule out of kilter. Furthermore too many soldiers had quit for Captain Thomsen to dare allow the groups to continue the long march.

In the barracks it would be difficult to recognize the silent, struggling groups from the forest roads. They were all chattering loudly to each other, and none were in any hurry to go to bed.

"Damn, it is almost sad that they halted the competition," said some. "We had come so far, we could easily have continued."

All discord and petulance disappeared. There were many comradely comments and complements. Those who quit the competition swore that they also wanted to continue. "If it only weren't for my damned foot..."

That same afternoon was the platoon's day to be canteen keeper. Captain Thomsen gave out the prizes. The 1st Group won and the 4th Group took second place. All who completed the field competition stepped forward and received the soldier's badge. Those who quit or were written off as sick remained seated and applauded the achievements of their comrades.

Afterward the platoon talked itself through the hardships of the past 24 hours. That which was suffering and pain was now, hours later, turned into genial memories with which to test the patience of girlfriends and future progeny.

#### The Russian Threat

The person who first made the word "spetsnaz" commonly known in the Western

world was the mystical pseudonym Victor Suvorov.

Suvorov, who claims to be a defected Russian tank commander, described in his book "inside the Soviet Army" how the Russian armed forces train elite soldiers who, just before a Soviet invasion, will nestle down in an enemy country and knock out key functions. This is to make a quick mobilization impossible.

According to him spetsnaz soldiers are brainwashed, self-sacrificing supermen who know in detail the countries where they will act, and who often are fluent in the language without the least accent.

Before an invasion the Soviet Union will exchange part of its embassy personnel for spetsnaz soldiers, and send in others pretending to be sports figures or tourists.

When the day later arrives, the spetsnaz personnel will strike against the exposed country's brain (government and military leadership), nerve system (electricity and communications networks), and teeth (vital parts of the military apparatus). Later the Soviet Army merely marches in on a broad front.

The mystical Suvorov was asked in a TV interview how long a captured soldier could hold out in an interrogation by a spetsnaz soldier. He replied, "The toughest, probably two seconds."

Besides the hair-raising descriptions of these superman soldiers, Suvorov also detailed how spetsnaz, or the diversionary units, as they are also called, are organized. He could tell which ones were in command and which were administrative units.

He could also tell how many spetsnaz soldiers are assigned to operations in every Western country.

#### Bloody Serious

Many observers doubt Suvorov's mission. They have found many loopholes in his stories and his account of his own background. Some have gone so far as to call him a story-telling bluff who is only interested in making money.

But Suvorov has been taken bloody seriously by Western intelligence services. Entire NATO exercises have been held to train the defense against sabotage units of Suvorov's model.

The Swedish military leadership does not hide the fact that it has been deeply impressed by "Inside the Soviet Army." It was in this book that the idea of minisubmarines was first introduced.

Military security services have also interviewed Suvorov to get a deeper knowledge of spetsnaz. Much of what has lately been written and leaked from secret military papers could almost have been extracted from the secretive and remarkably well-informed tank commander, even though the military says it has

access to many other secret sources.

An investigation was established within the military in 1983 to examine Sweden's readiness in this area, and last fall it published "Prov. Sabf. Provisoriska" (Instructions and General Advice for Measures Against Sabotage Units).

#### Short Mobilization

In the future education about sabotage units and training in how to fight them will be a part of the basic training of all Swedish units. The Home Guard and the Plant Guard (persons assigned to certain state plants) will also receive basic training for these combat roles. The guards are the units which have the shortest mobilization times, and they therefore have important functions to fill in protection against sabotage.

Furthermore every troop unit will set up special units to protect important installations and persons at the installation for when an enemy may send in sabotage personnel.

The Air Force was first with such an antisabotage unit--Air Base Commandos, which began to be formed in 1983. This year the Army also started a special unit, and the Navy is expected to follow, probably with a new section at the Coastal Commando School.

This year the fourth year group of Air Base Commandos is being trained at one of the country's largest air bases, F 7 at Sätenas, south of Lidköping. Every year two platoons will be trained so that in the future one or two platoons can be deployed around every wartime air base.

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CSO:3650/53

## YOUNG ARMY OFFICERS EXPLAIN REASONS FOR EARLY LEAVING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Jan 87 p 9

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Young Officers in Survey: Low Wages Cause Departure"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] About half of the nearly 300 younger Army officers who are going through the senior course at the Officers Academy at Karlberg have considered quitting the professional military service.

That was shown by a survey conducted at the school which was intended to chart attitudes and causes of the very large early departures of officers from the Army. The young officers say that too low wages are the reason why they are considering leaving--but also the large imbalance between resources and tasks out in the Army units.

"With this action we want to set a large alarm clock before ~~the senior~~ military officers so that they will understand the serious situation that the Army is in," said Tommy Jonasson, age 25, second lieutenant in the Army.

In the Army today there are about 16,000 officers. There are about 1,100 vacancies. Nearly 500 officers quit last year.

#### Choose to Quit

The action by the young Karlberg officers is not intended to discuss security policy, defense decisions or what should be the level of Sweden's defenses. It is intended to try to illuminate the situation of the young Army Officers, and why so many choose to quit.

There are many gloomy statistics to describe the flight of the officers. Of the 175 Army officers in engineer units who went through the course at the Officers Academy, there are 25 remaining who are continuing their military careers.

A newly commissioned officer who was trained under the NBO [New Officer Arrangement] system, which has been in effect since 1982-83, is very attractive to commercial life. The newspaper of the business world HEADHUNTER describes what good executives are produced in the military.

Magnus Jorgel, second lieutenant, living in Lund, gets between 8,000 and 8,500 kronor per month for service with troops. He recently received an offer from a large firm to be the assistant to the chief of personnel and be responsible for internal training--paying about 15,000 kronor per month plus an official car..

"Obviously such an offer caught my attention--even though I am happy being an officer. The pay is too low for young officers with troops, I can certainly confirm that," said Magnus Jorgel to DAGENS NYHETER.

The officers surveyed at Karlberg thought that a platoon leader (lieutenant or captain) should be paid 12,000 kronor per month. Today he receives between 9,000 and 10,000.

He compared Sweden with Norway. A Swedish Army officer is ordered around the entire country. He must be ready to move from Stockholm to Boden, then to Eksjo and the military staff in Kristianstad. The Swedish Army officer gets help with the moving--his moving van is paid, plus 850 kronor in "curtain money."

His Norwegian officer colleague gets a moving allowance of between 150,000 and 200,000 kronor, to enable the family to make the social adjustments involved in moving.

In Norway there are quarters for officers, while the Swedish officers get no help in finding accomodations. There is talk of procuring quarters in Stockholm, where accomodations are scarce.

Of the 280 Karlberg officers surveyed, 9 out of 10 believe that low pay is a reason why they are considering leaving the service.

Problems in the working environment in Army units have been studied against the background of the officer shortage. A lone lieutenant has a heavy task to singlehandedly train his platoon. It requires careful planning which often takes place during free time. Safety cannot be compromised. Many exercises in, for example, a rifle company, include explosives and live firing with real ammunition. Beyond that the lieutenant must be in the field at least one month out of the year, and take care of extensive paperwork.

"This wears you out in the long run," said Lars Nilsson, lieutenant, age 27, one of the oldest in the course.

#### Pole Jumper

An Army officer in 1987 can be compared with a pole jumper. Those who decide are forcing him to jump higher every time. But after every jump a little bit is cut off of the pole. It cannot continue.

"We are happy being officers, and are prepared to train ourselves in the tasks of war. But we believe the time is ripe to go out and show what a serious

situation the Army is in, and why so many officers are leaving. The choice for a young person is difficult.

The survey of the 280 officers of the senior course at Karlberg will be reported to Lieutenant General Erik G. Bengtsson, chief of the Army. Several times before the Defense Decision he said that the early departures in the Army must be stopped.

"We hope that our action will really wake them all up," said the four Army officers to DAGENS NYHETER.

9287  
CSO:3650/53

**AIR FORCE CHIEF DEMANDS BUDGET INCLUDE NEW DRAKEN SQUADRON**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Jan 87 p 12

[Article by Sven Svensson: "New Draken Squadron Demanded By Air Force"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] A fourth Draken squadron would be a clear and very valuable strengthening of the Air Force. This was written by Sven Olof Olson, chief of the Air Force, in a letter on Thursday to the Defense Committee. The message is a sudden turnaround on the part of the Air Force.

The military leadership in its alternative proposed procurement of a new squadron of Viggens, which is estimated to cost a couple of billion.

The defense agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party contained no room for a new Viggen squadron, and not even a half squadron, which the Conservative and Center Parties asked for.

Originally Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg proposed procurement of a new Draken squadron in a speech in Visby last summer. This alternative was rejected as unthinkable because of the pilot shortage.

The lack of clarity which arose between the Viggen and the Draken was blamed by the chief of the Air Force on the fact that he had never had the opportunity to report his position to the Defense Committee.

**Needed in Peacetime**

The need for reinforcement of the fighter aircraft force is present in the near term, wrote the Air Force chief. The fighter is the most flexible means of defense both as to range, grouping ability, choice of weapons and more. The need for reinforcement exists in peacetime to improve surveillance over the Baltic, among other things.

The procurement of another Draken squadron, which in that case would be assigned to Gotland, can be decided at the earliest in the Defense Decision which will take effect 1991/92. In that case a connection must be found with the procurement of an extra JAS squadron later in the 1990's.

## Cheaper

The procurement of a new Draken squadron will be cheaper. There are plenty of Drakens in Sweden which can be flown for a number of hours more. Fifty-six Drakens will be renovated for lifetime renewal of three Draken squadrons according to the 1984 party leader agreement.

A squadron normally consists of 18 aircraft. Twelve planes are needed to keep eight in the air, and added to these is the so-called crash reserve.

The Liberal Party member in the Defense Committee, Hans Lindblad, considers that it is enough with the modernization of a total of 60 Drakens to set up a fourth squadron. A crash reserve is not needed. The cost for the extra division can therefore be limited to 30-40 million.

It was over this latest weekend that the military began to get interested in the Draken alternative, and to get in contact with the party leaders. They understood that the Viggen solution was not approved.

These contacts disclosed that a Draken squadron can be established faster than a Viggen squadron, and its armament would be more effective. There are plenty of unutilized missiles for Draken, but not for Viggen.

After the turnabout by the military, the Draken alternative was taken up by the finishing Defense Committee. Carl Bildt (Conservative Party) recommended that 300 million be set aside in the coming Defense Decision for the establishment of a Draken squadron. Gunnar Bjork of the Center Party was also positive to the proposal.

The Conservative and Center Parties have formerly gone along with the recommendations of the chief of the Air Force and the OB [Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces] recommendations for a new Viggen squadron.

The Social Democrats on the committee do not believe there is any reason to take a position now on a new Draken squadron.

Examination of the defense agreement between the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party shows that the military authorities have in reality received 600 million more for the coming defense period than calculated.

The base level of the defense agreement starts at 23,759 million per year in February 1986 prices.

This base level includes an amount of 119 million per year which includes, among other things, the conscription costs, which formerly were outside the military budget. For the entire five-year period this amounts to an additional 600 million.

Therefore the OB avoids making corresponding cuts in material procurement, even though the limit on improvements of 6,200 million in 5 years remains.

This discovery means that it is 6.8 and not 6.2 billion for the 5-year period to be financed. Assuming 4-5 percent inflation, that means that financing through increased energy taxes and increases in expenditures will rise fairly evenly.

**CIVIL DEFENSE SYSTEM SEEN HARMED IN LONG-RANGE DEFENSE PLAN**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Jan 87 p 3

[Op Ed article by Ingemar Myhrberg: "Bargaining With Human Lives"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] In order to pay for military armaments, the civil defense appropriation is being cut by about 1.5 billion during the next four years. Besides shelters, cuts will include civil defense material such as protective clothing. The defense agreement means that we are buying powder and ball at the expense of future sacrifices in human life among the population, writes Ingemar Myhrberg, journalist with "Voices" in RADIO/TV.

Just before the last Defense Decision I could confirm in an article that civil defense suffered from serious shortages. It was a bitter reality which was made obvious among the ruins of Rosersberg, the civil defense training area outside of Stockholm. There was a shortage of money, trained people and a screaming need for shelters and gas masks. There had been no worthwhile training in protection against nuclear, biological or chemical weapons for 10 years.

Over 3 million Swedes lacked shelter space. Just as many lacked gas masks. For small children there was practically no breathing protection. In the Stockholm inner city there was shelter space for only every tenth person of the roughly half million who are there during the daytime. Other shocking and frightening figures are secret.

Fortunately there was one positive Defense Decision favorable to civil defense in 1982, and slowly but steadily steps could be taken to rectify the worst shortages, primarily in shelters. This positive development was destroyed in one stroke by the current defense agreement.

According to the state Rescue Service, the construction of shelters in the long-term will be halved, which means it will take up to 40 years to eliminate the shortage.

In the meanwhile we are forced to concentrate on certain areas within large cities, and in other places cease production altogether. For those who live

in single family dwellings or row houses there will no longer be any talk of shelters unless they are located right in front of a military target.

In order to pay for military armaments we are cutting civil defense appropriations (in relation to the lowest planning level) by about 1.5 billion kronor in the next five years. This is obviously a considerable sum in a total budget of only something over one billion annually.

Besides shelters this action also hits civil defense material which is today largely obsolete or worn out. This applies mainly to communications material including telephone, radio, fire and rescue equipment, protective clothing and equipment to combat nuclear and chemical weapons.

This cut means bargaining with human lives which is unacceptable, especially against the background that the civil population is expected to be 90 percent of the victims of a coming war.

In addition to the pure human suffering which a weakened civil defense can cause, the military strength that they are trying to arm is also indirectly harmed. If the homefront falls the fighting units also fall. An unprotected civil population makes us vulnerable to external threats of different kinds.

The defense agreement means that we are buying powder and ball at the expense of future sacrifices of human lives among the civilian population.

Equally serious is the drastic cutback of oil stocks and the reduced readiness stocks of strategic metals, also done with the motive of paying for military armaments. In the past we have stored oil so that in a crisis or a blockade we could manage for about 12 months. This safety margin will now be reduced to only "a couple" of months (the exact figure is secret) and large amounts of oil are accordingly being sold. In the mass media this is being presented as something positive for both the state, industry, the public and defense.

The truth is exactly the opposite. It is again a matter of bargaining with human lives and the welfare of individuals for the benefit of powder and ball.

With open eyes (?) we are therefore taking the risk of both starving and freezing to death when the oil runs out after a couple of months of blockade and Sweden in all respects comes to a halt. I find that irresponsible, almost criminal to put it mildly.

Is there any reasonable thought behind this? Let us for a moment listen to the reasoning of the Defense Committee. There they said that a war in Europe can last about two months at the most. This war can, however, consist of a phase of increasing tensions and weapon rattling which can last for about a year. Previous Defense Committees have estimated that imports under such crisis conditions would amount to a maximum of 20-30 percent of normal. And in that case we must store oil and other needs for at least 12 months.

However the current Defense Committee in its wisdom has suddenly decided that despite all crises we will be able to keep our imports up to 60-80 percent,

and so we will be able to cover our most indispensable needs.

So no preparedness storage is needed. It will be sufficient to save oil and other necessities for the above-mentioned two-months-long war. Presto, the oil can be sold, the money can be taken in and exchanged for coastal corvettes.

But how can the Defense Committee reach such optimistic assumptions about imports during a crisis? To a layman it sounds like Russian roulette.

It is difficult to escape the suspicion that the Defense Committee simply pursued backward thinking. The oil stocks caught their eye, there was money to be had. By changing a few percentage points in very uncertain import predictions they could release exactly as much oil as they needed to pay for the desired military armaments.

As in the case of the shelters, this again does not only have to do with suffering of the civilian population. All of our defensive capability is going to be hit. We will be easy prey for economic warfare, and pressure of all kinds. In such a situation it can be impossible to retain freedom of action and neutrality.

Will the oil run out before the above mentioned two-months-long war begins? If so, the defense is also halted, including the canons which were purchased for the liberated oil billions.

That which I have touched upon is something which concerns every citizen, his own and his family's safety and survival. Still the interest in civil and economic defense seems to be zero. The mass media bears a large part of the responsibility for this. Civil defense is not as spectacular and exciting as depth charges and Viggen aircraft.

Nor is there an aggressive and gun-happy politician such as Carl Bildt who speaks warmly for the civilian parts of our total defense, except for only a young and mild Anna Lindh, chairperson of SSU [Social Democratic Youth of Sweden].

Still everybody should easily be able to imagine what war or blockade would have meant this winter--without oil, without shelters and without equipment or planned countermeasures against fallout from perhaps hundreds of "Chernobyls" (nuclear explosions) in our area.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

AIR FORCE HOPES NEW CIVILIAN PILOT TRAINING EASES OFFICER DRAIN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Jan 87 p 6

[Article by Lars Dahl: "Solution to the Airlines Problem--Pilot Training Being Revised"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Perhaps the greatest problem for the airlines just now, the pilot shortage, is on the way to being solved. At a meeting in Government House on Thursday the parties, the airline companies, the pilots association, the Air Force and the Ministry of Communications agreed on a new model for training of airline pilots.

The unity will now be translated into a binding agreement which must eventually also be dealt with in the Riksdag.

The new model calls for the Air Force to take responsibility for the ground training in the Airline Pilots Academy at Ljungbyhed, and the companies, primarily SAS, Linjeflyg and Swedair, to together conduct the continued, so-called company adapted training, which thereby will be conducted entirely in the civilian sphere.

Military

Furthermore the airline companies will undertake to test the pilot material for teaching at private flying schools. These must also be utilized in order to quickly and totally eliminate the pilot shortage.

According to the existing situation, airline pilot training is entirely under the chief of the Air Force. It was this military leadership which led the Swedish Pilots Association, SPF, and all its members almost a year ago to boycott the school by refusing to teach there. That caused a drastic reduction in the training.

The model now agreed upon is largely identical with a proposal from the pilots association, which wanted a division into military and civilian parts.

### New Instructors

Now it is expected that the capacity of the Ljungbyhed school will be increased from 30 to 45 students by cutting down the flying time per student from 275 hours to 240. Four new instructors will later give the school the capacity of 60 students per year.

For the airline companies the changes in the training mean extra costs which are calculated to come to 200,000 kronor per student.

Airlines in Sweden have a shortage of 50-60 pilots. The shortage is expected to be as great next year.

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ENERGY

GREECE

ENERGY PRODUCTION REPORTEDLY LAGS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 10 Feb 87 p 7

/Excerpt/ Energy production problems were discussed yesterday by the DEI /Public Power Corporation/ ASKE /Representative Council on Social Control/. The great concern of worker representatives and social authorities (self-administration, TEE /Technical and Vocational Education/, etc.) over the impasse encountered by our energy balance because of energy policy being followed over the past few years was one of the topics discussed.

It was primarily emphasized that the situation created in the energy field and that has been manifested by a lack of energy was the result of a delay in the construction of new production plants the responsibility for which is shouldered (at least the biggest) by DEI management after 1985 which is also blamed for decreased yields in the production system particularly the hydroelectric and lignite plants.

The reasons attributed to the delay in projects (new units) and in the development of lignite mines were noted by ASKE representatives as follows:

1. To the insufficiency of funds by DEI for the construction of new projects and for developing domestic energy sources.
2. To DEI's bad organization and other anomalies in operations that led to shortages in production and anti-economic management.

It was also noted that import of electric power to make up for the shortages is anti-economic in nature and is in direct opposition with DEI's planning. An imported kilowatt hour costs DEI 7 drachmas more than that produced by its own plants.

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